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This thesis explores how various computer programs 
construct poems and addresses the way several critics 
respond to these computer generated texts. Surprisingly, 
little attention has heretofore been paid to these programs. 
Critics who have given the matter attention usually focus on 
only one of the myriad programs available, and more often 
than not, such scholarship concludes with a disparagement of 
all such projects. My work reexamines computer generated 
poetry on a larger scale than previously exists, positing 
some conclusions about how these texts affect contemporary 
theories of authorship and poetic meaning.
My first chapter explicates the historical debate over the 
use and limits of technology in the generation of text, 
studying similitudes between certain artistic movements and 
computer poetry. This historical background reveals that 
the concept of mechanically generated text is nothing new.
My second chapter delineates how the two main families of 
computer poetry programs actually create these texts. 
Computer programs combine existing input text, aleatory 
functions, and semantic catalogues, which provides insight 
into how humans both create and interact with these 
programs. At the same time, this study illustrates the 
difficulty in defining the level of intention and influence 
by individuals on the textual product, and therefore these 
texts challenge our traditional notions of authorship and 
the value of poetry. My third and final chapter argues that 
contemporary literary theory and poetics creates the 
conditons under which computer generated poetry can pose as 
a human product. The success of these programs to deceive 
readers about the origins of the text becomes clearer with 
the results of a survey I conducted in which the respondents 
were fooled by the machine more often than not. This 
possibility of machine-created text masquerading as human 
art threatens many critics, who quickly dismiss the process 
and its results as non-poetic, but I conclude that since the 
computer complicates foreknowledge of origin in some 
contemporary poetic forms, this intrusion by the machine 
prompts us to reconsider how we traditionally value and 
interpret poetry.
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Introduction
But the amazing growth of our techniques, the 
adaptability and precision they have attained, the 
ideas and habits they are creating, make it a 
certainty that profound changes are impending in the 
ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there 
is a physical component which can no longer be 
considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot 
remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power.
— Paul Valéry, "The Conquest of Ubiquity"
In "A Defence of Poetry," Percy Shelley writes that 
"[pjoetry, in a general sense, may be defined to be 'the 
expression of the imagination'" (956). Publishing in 1840, 
Shelley argues that poetry exists as an exalted human 
product, noting that it "in a more restricted sense 
expresses those arrangements of language, and especially 
metrical language, which are created by that imperial 
faculty whose throne is curtained within the invisible 
nature of man" (Shelley 958). At about the same time and in 
another part of England, Charles Babbage was working on a 
machine that would eventually be known as his "Analytical 
Engine," and which the world would widely regard as the 
first programmable computer, operating with a decimal rather 
than the modern binary system. Although it never ran, 
Babbage's Engine used a location for a set of instructions 
(much like the cards of a Jacquard loom) by which the 
machine would perform its functions. It also allowed for 
data to be called from one location, manipulated, and stored 
in a different place. Of course, today's electronic, 
digital computers operate at speeds millions of times faster
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than the Engine could have run, but Babbage's machine, 
although fettered by the limits of mid-nineteenth century 
technology, combined abilities never before built into any 
machine. Able to operate from a program and manipulate data 
outside of human interference, it was a crucial step towards 
a technology that might one day, as Babbage hoped, 
substitute "machinery, not merely for the skill of the human 
hand, but for the relief of the human intellect" (Kurzweil 
165) .
One hundred and fifty years later, both Babbage's 
machine and Shelley's view of poetry have evolved to a 
unique point in human history : the successful programming of 
a machine to create what some might call poetry.  ̂ Computer 
scientists, literary theorists, and poets have been 
programming computers to compose text since the 1960s, but 
only recently have realized successful results. The 
fruition of these projects emerges not only from 
advancements in computer technology but also from 
experiments in several poetic schools that create the 
environment through which the output of a computer poetry 
program can mimic its human counterparts with some modicum 
of success.
With their immense speed and storage capabilities, 
computers use brute force to compensate for the inability to 
"think" in the same manner as the human brain. They can
3
work in hostile environments of temperature and atmosphere, 
control indefatigable industrial robots that function more 
precisely than human laborers, and calculate complex 
problems faster that any person, but no computer has been 
able to master that which allows us to define, express, and 
explore our "humanness"--our language. Nevertheless, 
language engages in an undeniable relationship with 
technology. Literary art reflects advancements in 
technological evolution, often upsetting traditions and 
expectations in favor of new forms of expression, and these 
cycles of change appear in the area of poetics as well. For 
example, the introduction of written languages to supplant 
oral literatures allowed for a text to be arranged as visual 
phenomenon; manifest and tactile, marks on the page could be 
sized and ordered by the author for specific effects. In 
the fifteenth century, Gutenberg's moveable type permitted 
for more efficient production and distribution of written 
texts, and in turn, created a greater audience for these 
works. The production of the printed word vastly increased 
with the invention of the portable typewriter, which placed 
typographical symbols of the printing press on the desk at 
the immediate disposal of the authors. Historically, these 
advancements in technology generate changes in poetic form-- 
e.g., pattern poetry in the 1600s, the typewriter work of e. 
e. Cummings, and the concrete poetry of John HoHander--and
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these new methods subsequently affect the way we conceive 
and interpret poetry. Most writers today view the computer 
simply as an efficient and sophisticated typewriter, where 
word-processing programs manipulate textual elements much 
more cleanly and easily than an old portable Royal or 
Olivetti.
But the separation between the computer and the pen or 
typewriter emerges in the computer's ability to be 
programmed; the computer does not always require human 
intervention to complete its task, aside from an initial 
instruction set. This removal of a human subject who can be 
directly connected with the output complicates the 
assignation of authorship; many critics contend that the 
programmer is ultimately the author of these texts, yet upon 
closer investigation we find that this distinction becomes 
difficult to maintain.
The presence of the author of a text held privileged 
status in literature prior to the advent of structural 
formalism; in fact, the field of literary studies began by 
primarily focusing on the biography of the author, drawing 
conclusions and meanings about the function of art by 
comparing the poet's life to his or her work. But in the 
first half of the twentieth century, literary critics faced 
increasing competition from the empirical sciences and, as a 
result, a new school of literary theory— named New
Criticism--emerged in response to claims of arbitrariness 
and subjectivity in the field of literary study. This new 
way of viewing literature separated the author from the work 
for the first time, arguing that the work of art should be 
foregrounded as the object of study. For these New Critics, 
such as W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, "the design 
or intention of the author is neither available nor 
desirable as a standard for judging literary works," (248) 
and therefore what the author plans in a work becomes 
irrelevant and unknowable because the poem "is detached from 
the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his 
power to intend about it or control it" (249). Yet despite 
such claims, Wimsatt and Beardsley still implicitly posit 
the need for an author, even if lurking about in the 
shadows, by qualifying that "a poem does not come into 
existence by accident. The words of a poem...come out of a 
head not out of a hat" (248-9).
New Critics contended that they could "distinguish 
between right and wrong readings of a poem" by viewing the 
work as a structure of norms or standards (Wellek 260), 
through which the work can only be attributed value and 
importance as a literary piece according to how well it 
achieves these preconceived standards. The New Critics did 
not, therefore, completely banish the author. Instead they 
simply placed his or her importance at a greater remove from
the text--replacing the author with the work as the primary 
source of meaning.
Poststructuralism, more explicitly the work of Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault in the late 1960s, questioned 
this repositioning of the author and the perseverance of 
theories that privilege the author's importance. Barthes, 
in his essay "The Death of the Author" (1968), notes that 
the text "is that neuter, that composite, that obliquity 
into which our subject flees, the black-and-white where all 
identity is lost, beginning with the body that writes" (54- 
5). According to Barthes, New Criticism never eradicated 
the author's power, but "quite often merely consolidated it' 
(55). In contrast to this methodology, he argues that 
"[o]nce the Author is distanced, the claim to 'decipher' a 
text becomes entirely futile" (58). According to Barthes, 
the text owes its existence to those texts that exist both 
at the same time and before it; words in the language open 
up to other words, not towards a final objective meaning: 
"The space of writing is to be traversed, not pierced; 
writing constantly posits meaning, but always in order to 
evaporate it: writing seeks a systematic exemption of 
meaning" (58).
In a similar fashion, Michel Foucault suggests that 
"the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the 
singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the
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dead man in the game of writing" {What is 264). Foucault 
posits this role as the "author function," a position that 
exists out of a necessity to mark "speech that must be 
received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, 
must receive certain status" {What is 267). This "author 
function" does not correspond to a particular individual, 
but rather arises from the act of recognizing the work as 
literature; it emerges as "the result of a complex operation 
which constructs a certain rational being that we call 
'author'" {What is 269).
Even in Foucault, this "rational being" implies that 
the text must have a human producer. In 1969, computer 
generated text was in its infancy, but today's programs 
appear able, in some circumstances, to be mistaken for human 
authors, especially because poetry changed drastically since 
Shelley's "Defence." Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein, T.S. Eliot 
and other modernists of the early twentieth century changed 
the landscape of poetry by reconceiving poetic form at the 
same time that the work of the Dadaist and Surrealist 
movements challenged the traditional relationship between 
art and artist. New Criticism and poststructuralism, by 
reducing the importance of the author to varying degrees, 
initiated new forms of poetry that engaged these new 
theories. The projective verse of the Black Mountain school 
in the 1950s supposedly recreated the breathing of the poet.
an idea that implies an author in some relationship to the 
text. In reaction, the Language poets, influenced by 
poststructuralism and the Dadaists, undermined this idea of 
"voice"--the speaking subject— by attempting to fracture 
language. Their abolition of the authoritative "I" of the 
poem relied on the concept of language as a system of 
signification, an intricate play of words that can be 
manipulated and subverted to reveal power and oppression as 
it exists in the historically real world.
This shift by some poets towards "meaningless" 
language, or at least towards texts that do not overtly 
claim to conform to traditional conceptions of the poem as a 
vehicle for meaning, coincided with yet another theoretical 
movement away from the text itself towards audience. 
Transactional, speech act, and reader-response (or 
reception) theories all posit the reader as the producer of 
meaning, and this focus--combined with poetries that react 
against form and meaning--provides the opportunity for 
computer generated poetry to exist. Computer poetry can 
successfully mimic these poetries, because the ego created 
by the human "I" no longer needs to be present, creating a 
location in which to consider those texts generated by 
machines as art. But the absence of the author complicates 
our classification of computer texts as such, because we may 
not always be able to determine whether or not a machine
created the poem. Even if a human poet claims complete 
authorship for a text, a skeptical critic will guard against 
becoming the victim of a human poet's pranks or 
intentionally misleading comments.
As readers and critics, we face a new challenge about 
how to view poetry, primarily because New Critical 
methodologies still influence academic pedagogy as well as 
composition of anthologies today. If we view poetry as an 
evolving, rather than stagnant art form, as a process that 
includes structural experimentation, then we have to be just 
as flexible in our consideration of the agency responsible 
for these new forms.
*  *  *
In the chapters that follow, this thesis illustrates 
how various computer programs construct texts and discusses 
the way several critics respond to these computer generated 
texts. Surprisingly, little attention has previously been 
paid to these programs. Critics usually focus on only one 
of the myriad programs available, and more often than not, 
such scholarship concludes with a disparagement of all such 
projects. I consider this work as an effort both to 
reexamine computer generated poetry on a larger scale than 
presently exists and to posit some conclusions about how 
these texts affect contemporary theories of authorship and 
poetic meaning.
10
By manipulating textual data at blinding speeds and 
removing human subjectivity through random operations, the 
computer relies on two inspirational— and controversial—  
time-honored features of textual production. The mechanical 
production of text and the decision to relegate the 
compositional process to chance have occupied authors for 
over three hundred years, and my first chapter aligns 
computer generated poetry with these two traditions. An 
explication of the historical debate over the use and limits 
of technology in the generation of text and a study of the 
similarities between certain artistic movements and computer 
poetry, reveals that the concept of mechanically or 
electronically generated text is nothing new. Instead, the 
output of computer poetry programs today, and the promise of 
more complex and sophisticated ones in the future, appears 
as an initially successful realization of this tradition of 
mechanical textual generation.
My second chapter explores how the two main families of 
computer poetry programs actually create these texts. 
Although there exists two definable categories of text 
generating programs, this taxonomy includes programs which 
vary in such a degree that this classification can only be 
considered general at best. But how computer programs 
combine existing input text, aleatory functions, and 
semantic catalogues provides insight into how humans both
11
create and interact with these programs yet simultaneously 
illustrates the difficulty in defining the level of 
intention and influence by individuals.
These texts challenge our traditional notions of 
authorship and the value of poetry and my third chapter 
delineates how contemporary literary theory and poetics 
allows for computer generated poetry to pose as a human 
product. The success of these programs becomes clearer with 
the results of a survey I conducted in which the respondents 
were deceived by the machine more often than not. This 
possibility of machine created text masquerading as human 
art threatens many critics, who quickly dismiss the process 
as non-poetic. But under closer inspection, however, it 
appears difficult to maintain these claims because central 
to most disparagements is the foreknowledge that a text was 
generated by a machine. Yet, the process through which any 
author creates a poem often remains unknown to the reader, 
and certain critical theories reveal the present 
difficulties in attributing intention, with any degree of 
certainty, to a given author or process.
The modern computer does not "know" what it is doing in 
the same manner that we may imagine a human poet does, and 
some argue it never will. But if we can be deceived by a 
computer's output to the degree that we accept it as a 
creation of an individual person, then we need to rethink
12
the ways we conceive poetic theory, the function of the 
poem, and the role of the poet.
13
Notes :
1. In a remarkable coincidence, Ada Lovelace, Babbage's 
associate, linked the fields of computer science and poetry 
as early as the mid-nineteeth century. Regarded as the 
world's first computer programmer, Lovelace was also the 
only legitimate child of George Gordon, Lord Byron--a poet 
and contemporary of Shelley.
Chapter 1 : The Mechanics of Chance
"Perhaps no person can be a poet, or can even 
enjoy poetry, without a certain unsoundness of
mind."
--Thomas Babington Macaulay, 
Edinburgh Review 1825
As one version of the old adage goes, "Put enough monkeys 
in a room with a typewriter and eventually they will come up 
with King Lear." In actuality, the outcome is more likely 
to be a broken typewriter than a literary masterpiece, but 
the search for a feasible, mechanical, non-human system for 
the generation of texts has a long history, especially in 
Europe. The scientific discoveries of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, along with the Enlightenment period 
of the eighteenth century, stirred debate concerning the 
proper applications of empiricism and scientific invention. 
In 1678, John Peter created mathematical tables by which 
anyone with only a knowledge of the alphabet and numbers 
less than ten could create Latin verse. In his work 
Artificial Versifying : A New Way to Make Latin Verses, Peter 
distributes letters into tables, making extraordinary claims 
about the capacity of these tables to help essentially 
illiterate persons write poetry :
[A]ny one of ordinary capacity, that only knows 
the A. B. C. and can count 9 (although he 
understands not one word of Latin, or what verse 
means) may be plainly taught (and in as little
14
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time, as this is reading over) how to make 
thousands of hexameter and pentameter verses which 
shall be true Latine, true verse, and good 
sense, (frontispiece)
Peter's poetry by numbers created a stir of controversy in 
England, and in 1711 Joseph Addison and Richard Steele 
lampooned his approach (along with similar attempts by 
others) as misguided and ineffectual. Addressing the "many 
Artifices and Modes of False Wit," their response to Peter's 
methodology satirically attacks such applications of 
technology to the production of wit and intelligence:
But of all Contractions or Expedients for Wit, I 
admire that of an ingenious Projector whose book I 
have seen : This Virtuoso being a Mathematician, 
has, according to his Taste, thrown the Art of 
Poetry into a short Problem, and contrived Tables 
by which any one, without knowing a Word of
Grammar or Sense, may, to his great Comfort, be
able to compose or rather to erect Latin Verses. 
{The Spectator 356)^
Of course, Peter's tables did not turn poetry upside-down,
nor did they seem to have much lasting impact on the
literary world except as objects of ridicule by the 
privileged possessors of eighteenth-century wit. 
Nevertheless, the importance of Artificial Versifying
16
emerges through the implications it raises with regard to 
the production of texts mechanically.
Language is inherently a human production, or at the 
very least a production of an organic entity, and poetry in 
the Enlightenment was primariiy considered as a preeminent 
mode of communication. Peter's tables seem far more 
relevant today because, as we will see, the tabular method 
predominates one category of computerized text production 
and manipulation. The author of The Spectator article 
concludes by remarking that the only improvement to Peter's 
tables would be the construction of a device to automate 
these tables, one similar to "the project of a Dutch 
Mechanick, viz. a Mill to make Verses" (357). The 
"improvement," of course, is meant as a joke: by using a 
machine, the Dutch mechanic's method is even more misguided 
and further removed from the iocus of ianguage than Peter's 
tabies. The satire points to the ridiculousness of both 
Peter's and the mechanic's efforts, emphasizing what the 
author sees as a movement away from human understanding and 
communication. While the existence of the Dutch mechanic's 
mill cannot be substantiated, a fictional version of it 
appears fifteen years later in the Laputian Academy of 
Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels. At this Academy--a 
derisive censure of the misdirected application of 
scientific empiricism and invention--Swift's Gulliver
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records the folly of Laputian researchers, including a 
"Projector" who attempts to revert human excrement back into 
the original food, an architect who builds houses from the 
roof down, and a researcher who experiments with ways to 
make marble soft enough for pillows and to breed a variety 
of woolless sheep. More important to this discussion. Swift 
imagines a professor of "speculative Learning" who invents a 
word Engine. Consisting of a massive frame of wires, bits 
of wood, metal rods, and words written on paper, the Engine 
represents "a Project for improving speculative Knowledge by 
practical and mechanical Operations" (156). Operated by 
forty pupils, the Engine supposedly gives "the World a 
compleat Body of all Arts and Sciences":
Every one knew how laborious the usual method is 
of attaining the Arts and Sciences; whereas by his 
Contrivance, the most ignorant Person at a 
reasonable Charge, and with a little bodily Labor, 
may write Books in Philosophy, Poetry, Politicks, 
Law, Mathematicks and Theology, without the least 
Assistance from Genius or Study. (156)
Of course, in the early eighteenth century, only educated 
white males were privileged enough to engage in the usual 
"laborious" method, and although Swift read Addison and 
Steele, Marjorie Nicolson's work points out that the 
"sources for nearly all the theories of the Laputans [sic]
18
and Balnibarians are to be found in the work of Swift's 
contemporary scientists and particularly in the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society" (112).^
The average reader of 1726, with both knowledge of the 
limits of Enlightenment technology and ideas that realize 
the human monopoly on language and intent, could appreciate 
Swift's humorous indictment of the Laputian Academy and 
modern science. Neither Swift nor his readers could have 
foreseen the advent of digital computers and how these 
machines would affect the literary arts. Nevertheless, the 
operation of Swift's Engine shares remarkable similarities 
with several poetry generating programs of today:
The Pupils at his Command took each of them hold 
of an Iron Handle, whereof there were Forty fixed 
around the Edges of the Frame; and giving them a 
sudden Turn, the whole disposition of the Words 
was entirely changed. He then commanded Six and 
Thirty of the Lads to read the several Lines 
softly as they appeared upon the frame, and where 
they found three or four Words together that might 
make part of a sentence, they dictated to the four 
remaining Boys who were Scribes. (156)
Although mechanical, and requiring human power. Swift's 
machine utilizes a very primitive program: all the words of 
the language are represented in all forms, although not in
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any order; slender wires form connections between words, not 
unlike the way a semantic catalogue or thesaurus does; and 
the visual output varies. Although it remains unclear to 
the reader what function the slender connecting wires 
perform between words, the output must be left to chance 
because the pupils must search for short, sensible segments 
of three or four words--implying that a great deal of the 
product is nonsense. Likewise, the user of a poetry program 
may often sort through the computer's output, culling poetic 
moments from mountains of doggerel and incoherent 
phrasings.
Theoretically, by manipulating all the characters of 
the alphabet, including space, punctuation and other 
typographical characters, one could generate all the 
possible combinations of the language. In "The Library of 
Babel," Jorge Luis Borges creates a world where this 
occurs. The characters of Borges's fictive universe inhabit 
an infinite, spherical library, and since everything that 
can be written has been and nothing can be thought of that 
does not exist somewhere in the library, the inhabitants 
have nothing to do but wander aimlessly about the corridors 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of senseless texts. As with 
Swift's Engine, groupings of sensible words become artifacts 
and legendary objects of study: "Another (very much
consulted in this area) is a mere labyrinth of letters, but
20
the next-to-last page says Oh time thy pyramids" (53). The 
narrator responds to the discovery of an understandable 
linguistic phrase by ascribing its construction to a set of 
rules that must be contained in yet another undiscovered 
book. In such an overwhelming creation as this library, 
permutâtional computation eliminates chance, and although 
Swift's scientist never mentions this fanciful and 
unsettling outcome as a possibility of his machine, 
contemporary readers of Borges's short story may interpret 
his library as a future product of a very fast and powerful 
computer with enough time and memory to complete its task. 
The mathematical or mechanical production of language 
to which all of these authors refer creates problems because 
such a process can, and usually does, display an 
incompetency with language. The ability to use a language 
involves much more than the production of grammatically 
correct sentences; ordinary linguistic constructions must be 
semantically correct as well. We often take for granted the 
knowledge of what makes for sensible discourse because the 
distinction between nonsense and significance seems 
immediately obvious to native speakers of a language. But 
the process of learning to use language is incredibly 
complex: it involves our sensory experience of the world,
it resides in our cultural interactions with others in "real 
time," it depends on recognition of what Ludwig Wittgenstein
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calls the "language game" in which we are currently 
involved,^ and it tests our ability to recognize and adapt 
to neologisms and changing lexical meanings. The computer, 
like any other machine, lacks this "intelligence" of how to 
derive signification from linguistic constructions and to 
use semantically correct language for given situations. 
Without this knowledge, a computer program relies instead on 
deception. When asked a question, it produces stock 
responses that often appear stilted, or it replies with 
another question--turning the problem back onto the human 
interrogator.  ̂ But in creating an output that gives the 
appearance of linguistic competency, as in the case of 
poetry, often the computer's program selects textual 
elements by utilizing a random number generator. Without a 
semantic understanding of the language, computers alter the 
results each time and achieve variety by relegating the 
output to chance operations.
The creation of text through random generation is not 
the sole domain of mechanical and electronic devices nor is 
this mode of production alone a valid criteria for 
dismissing computer generated texts, for chance plays an 
important role in several modern artistic movements.
Although poets in the Romantic tradition viewed the world as 
order masquerading as chaos, the Dadaists (influenced by 
Futurism, Symbolism, and Cubism) embraced chance as a new
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method of creating art free from the stifling expectations 
of previous traditions. Whereas chance was previously 
understood as a subject of poetic discourse, it had now 
become a necessary principle in the creation of poetry. The 
most famous and prolific artists of the Dada movement--Hans 
Arp, Tristan Tzara, Hugo Ball, Kurt Schwitters, Andre 
Breton, and Hans Richter--utilized chance in an attempt to 
unfetter art from the conscious interference of its 
creator. Richter, in DADA: Art and. Anti-art, explains "the
central experience of Dada" as follows:
Dada's propaganda for a total repudiation of art 
was in itself a factor in the advance of art. Our
feeling of freedom from rules, precepts, money and
critical praise. . . was a major stimulus. The
freedom not to care a damn about anything, the 
absence of any kind of opportunism, which in any
case could have served no purpose, brought us
closer to the source of all art, the voice within 
ourselves. The absence of any ulterior motive 
enabled us to listen to the voice of the 
'Unknown'--and to draw knowledge from the realm of 
the unknown. (50)
The idea of this unknown realm, supposedly a place where 
knowledge preexists and one that the artist may harness in
the creative process appealed to the Dadaists as a way to
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repudiate dominant artistic culture and tradition. Harriet 
Watts, in her insightful work Chance: A Perspective on Dada, 
remarks that through this unknown "one can posit systems of 
order, means of cohesion which have not yet been accepted 
and legitimatized by established intellectual traditions" 
(155).
In twentieth-century physics and psychology, the 
unknown became fertile ground for revolutionary ideas, 
exemplified in guantum mechanics by Werner Heisenberg's 
celebrated uncertainty principle which posits that simply 
observing a physical process at the sub-atomic level affects 
the interpretation of that phenomenon (Kurzweii 116, 193).
Therefore, predicting such events becomes impossible, or 
indeterminant, because of the paradoxically unavoidable 
interference of the observer. Similarly, Sigmund Freud's 
work in psychoanalysis had a profound impact on the Dadaists 
to varying degrees, as Richter confesses:
Chance appeared to us as a magical procedure by 
which one could transcend the barriers of 
causality and of conscious volition, and by which 
the inner eye and ear became more acute, so that 
new seguences of thoughts and experiences made 
their appearance. For us, chance was the 
'unconscious mind' that Freud had discovered in 
1900. (57)
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For the Romantic poets, the concept of the sublime increases 
perceptual awareness; the Dadaists, on the other hand, view 
chance as a more effective and objective method of realizing 
unconscious thoughts and images.
Supposedly, Hans Arp first discovered chance as a 
poetic instrument when he tore up a drawing in progress and 
let the pieces fall to the floor. Later, he happened to 
notice the arrangement of the scraps on the floor and 
realized that the pattern they formed revealed a quality he 
had been unable to attain consciously. Richter explains 
Arp's amazement by noting that "chance movements of the hand 
and of the fluttering scraps of paper had achieved what all 
his efforts had failed to achieve, namely expression" (51). 
Interpreting the genesis of this 'expression' proves more 
difficult than recognizing it; Richter cannot decide whether 
it was "the artist's unconscious mind, or a power outside 
him, that had spoken? Was it a mysterious 'collaborator' at 
work, a power in which one could place one's trust? Was it a 
part of oneself, or a combination of factors quite beyond 
anyone's control?" (Richter 51). While the Dada movement 
embraced Arp's Das Gesetz des Zufalls, or "Law of Chance," 
individual artists of the period, in pursuit of the answers 
to these questions, employed chance differently in their 
respective works.
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For example, Tristan Tzara also experimented with 
automatic writing and generated random texts using newspaper 
articles as the impetus for his art. His "Dada Manifesto on 
Feeble Love and Bitter Love" outlines his most famous 
experiment :
TO MAKE A DADAIST POEM
Take a newspaper.
Take some scissors.
Choose from this paper an article of the length 
you want to make your poem.
Cut out the article.
Next carefully cut out each of the words that
makes up this article and put them ail in a
b ag.
Shake gently.
Next take out each cutting one after the other.
Copy conscientiously in the order in which they 
left the bag.
The poem will resemble you.
And there you are--an infinitely original author
of charming sensibility, even though 
unappreciated by the vulgar herd. (Tzara 39)
Despite their similar methodologies, Tzara and Arp each 
viewed chance with a slightly different perception.
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and Watts illustrates their differing methodologies by 
considering Tzara's process. Apparently composed from a 
mutilated newspaper article shaken out of a paper bag,
Tzara's first line reads "when dogs cross the air in a
diamond like ideas and the appendix of the meninx tells the
time of the alarm programme (the title is mine) , to which 
Watts observes:
The most striking feature of the text is the fact
that all attempts to impose any intellectual order
on the flow of verbal elements will be thwarted. 
Had Arp begun with the [first line], the 'absurd' 
image would have been developed further. . . . The
suggestive range of the image would have been
filled out and amplified through Arp's verbal 
inventions; and the original accident would have 
been modified by the intervention of the conscious 
artist. Tzara, however, does not encourage this 
rounding out of the accidental image. (139)
Tzara's absolute reliance on chance prevents any further 
interference by the artist because "it is not the way the 
words fell" (Watts 139). However, this removal of the
artist curiously does not preclude authorship, for his
manifesto maintains that this random artistic creation or 
poem "will resemble you." Richter turns authorial function 
into a point of contention :
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Tzara exploited the same chance factors as did 
Arp, but while Arp made conscious use of his eye 
and brain to determine the final shape, and thus 
made it possible to call the work his, Tzara left 
the task of selection to Nature. He refused the 
conscious self any part of the process. . . . Arp
adhered to (and never abandoned) the idea of 
balance between conscious and unconscious. This 
was fundamental to me as well; but Tzara 
attributed importance exclusively to the Unknown. 
This was the real dividing-line. (Richter 60)
This "dividing line" between the two artistic positions 
regarded the intention of the author as determinable, and it 
separated and placed the perception of the Unknown, or 
unconscious mind, opposite the conscious mind and viewed 
these entities as accessible, or at least opened, by chance 
operations.
In contrast, Andre Breton also experiments with 
automatic writing, but claims that his method differs from 
Dada because it functions as a means to explore the 
unconscious. For Breton, "every product of the mind strove 
towards conclusion. Dada never concluded" and as early as 
1920, Breton broke from the tradition and "attempted to 
assimilate to Dada his personal ideas about poetry. . . and
on the role and destiny of this poetry which to him was
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closely related to psychoanalysis''--ideas that would later 
become instrumental in the Surrealist movement (Hugnet 190). 
Breton believed the "self" was what elided Richter's idea of 
the Unknown, and since arbitrary social and cultural 
conditions exert control over authorial intention, these 
conditions subsequently affect conscious creation. The 
insidious tradition of literature (and through implication, 
Arp and Richter) forces the artist "to correct, to correct 
oneself, to polish, to smooth out, to find fault instead of 
drawing blindly from subjective treasure" (Watten 44). 
Automatism, for Breton, allows the artist to break this 
"slavish custom" of literary production; it denies this 
"correction" of text to produce a creation free from the 
subjective control of the conscious mind.
Since automatic writing methods attempt to sever the 
artistic impulse from the constraints and intervention of 
the conscious mind, some scholars argue that such work 
supposedly produces or becomes a testament to the 
unconscious desires of its creator and therefore provides 
fertile ground for psychological criticism. According to 
John Erickson, the automatic poem "while offering an 
apparent unintelligibility to the reader, does contain 
certain discursive strategies that are susceptible to 
analysis" {Dada: Performance, Poetry, and Art 7 9). He 
argues for the work itself as a product of a certain
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process, and that process, ostensibly the endeavor through 
which the author removes himself from conscious 
determination, reveals how much the author actually is 
determining the text :
[Automatic writing] undergoes several mediating 
processes in becoming words on a page. Far from 
representing the transcription of raw outflowings 
of conscious thought, the Dada poem is acted on by 
several factors : rudimentary thought processes of
preconsciousness that impose a manifest form on 
the latent content of emotion and desire; the 
interposition of preexisting models (literary 
texts, media, everyday speech) whose borrowings 
direct or determine the text; the conscious mind 
of the poet who modifies the text to achieve 
specific effects (through lexical substitutions, 
etc.). (Erickson 79)
The difficulty with Erickson's explication lies in two 
implicit assumptions: first, he assumes a critical awareness 
of the text as an outcome of this process ; and second, he 
assumes the author as a split subject with both unconscious 
and conscious minds. Since the Dadaists, and critics such 
as Erickson, perceive the work of art as an extension of an 
individual and therefore influenced by an artist's 
unconscious, their assumptions rest a priori on the
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existence of a human author--even though Barthes argues that 
when "accepting the principle and the experiment of 
collective writing. Surrealism help[s] desacralize the image 
of the Author" (Barthes 56). Computer generated poetry 
undermines these presuppositions of authorial presence; if 
one attempts to analyze the author of the work, the computer 
complicates the determinacy of intent, whether conscious or 
unconscious, because of the difficulty of determining 
authorship and the randomized, mechanical production of the 
text. While the second factor excludes a direct 
relationship between the poetic avant-garde and the 
generation of texts by a computer, the determinacy of 
whether an operator of a poetry program alters the output 
(if one did, how would the reader know?) and the 
"rudimentary thought processes" of everyone involved— the 
computer programmer, the operator, and the author(s) of 
input texts--are both difficult, if not impossible, to 
ascertain or locate in the output.
Yet, since computers cannot operate without a program 
written by a human, there is, if only initially, a process 
of artistic determination made by an individual--but how 
much we can say about authorship appears uncertain; as I 
will show later, authorship may often involve several 
authors and random, mechanical intervention. Yet, the 
creation of text through chance operations necessarily
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involves at least one individual initiating the artistic 
process; as Watts notes :
The fact that [the artist] has chosen to create in 
this fashion makes him a causal factor in the 
whole process; he intervenes, even if only to 
designate the material that is to be subjected to 
random influences and to recognize any random 
object, pattern or event as suited to his own 
artistic needs. (156)
The question still remains as to how one substantially 
determines the causal connection and the level of 
intervention of this individual, and with regard to computer 
generated texts this may prove ultimately impossible-- 
comp11eating, at the very least, most previous theoretical 
approaches in poetics.
Although Dada was proclaimed "dead" in May 1 9 2 2 ,  ̂ the 
aims of the movement and the concept of chance generation of 
text was not forgotten. The influential composer John Cage 
created several musical works and poems through random 
generation, and since the 1960s, Language^ poets have 
experimented with chance in an effort to break free of what 
Michael Davidson refers to as "bardic, personalist 
impulses," and explicitly focus instead "on the material of 
language itself" {Princeton 675). By representing language 
"as s u c h , s t r i p p i n g  words of their assumed, everyday
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meanings, the poet creates the appearance of a non- 
interpretive "self." In such poetry, Barrett Watten 
concludes, "the 'self' has become generalized as 'language,' 
or, put another way, the 'self' has exploded and 
disappeared. . . The mediating persona has been abandoned"
(Watten 52).
Jackson Mac Low, a contemporary Language poet, 
generates texts through which, as Charles Bernstein 
suggests, "the language is exteriorized, no longer a 
transparent transport to a given world depicted (Bernstein 
252). Often, his poetry comes with performance 
instructions, allowing the reader to co-author the 
production of the text. For example, "Is That Wool Hat My 
Hat" consists of four separate voices to be read by up to 
four individuals, led by a "conductor" who keeps a beat. In 
addition. Mac Low's "diastic" technique, an linear acrostic 
method somewhat similar to Cage's mesostitch, creates poetic 
texts that appear to be generated randomly, when in fact 
their composition follows a specific formula, e.g., his work 
"Ridiculous in Piccadilly" where he composes eleven poems 
from Virginia Woolf's The Waves. Mac Low explains his 
method this way:
After finding the title phrase. . . I drew one
word for each of its letters. Beginning with the
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phrase itself, I culled only words in which the 
letters occupied corresponding positions (I 
disregarded hyphens): "ridiculous Piccadilly,//end 
stain/bookcase,/reassuring brutally/eating- 
house.//eating-house.//waitresses,/in and plates 
right/included.//prick contains forged 
companion/pale-yellow/smooth-polished melancholy/" 
upon which, having spelled the phrase out once, I 
began again. ("The Genesis of 'Ridiculous in 
Piccadilly'")
The systematic method through which Mac Low constructs these 
texts "refuses the normal process of identification of a 
'self' (voice, persona, sensibility) in the text as 
expressed or revealed" (Bernstein 252). To generate poetry 
in this manner, either through the chance rolls of a die or 
through a systematic template which appears random, involves 
an extensive time commitment on the part of the author; a 
commitment that can be reduced to a few seconds with the aid 
of a computer. Outside of an input text and an initial set 
of parameters, a computer can produce poetry in the same 
manner as Mac Low, precisely because Mac Low's methods are, 
to a considerable degree, mechanical and reproducible.®
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The artistic legacy of the Dadaists, combined with 
historical attempts at the mechanical generation or 
manipulation of texts, provides part of the poetic framework 
for computer generated poetry; it is a tradition through 
which the randomization of textual data offers a new way of 
perceiving both language and the world. "For creative and 
rebellious minds of the late 19th and 20th centuries," as 
Harriet Watts suggests, "Western aesthetics and rationalism 
were either totally discredited, or insufficient to render 
experience in its totality," and "chance was an obvious 
phenomenon to which to turn as a keyhole to the unknown, 
where other possibilities might well exist" (155). This 
discourse, shaped historically by repeated attempts of poets 
to break out of conventional modes of artistic 
representation, ultimately allows a context in which 
language rises to the "surface" of a poetic text, 
confounding an anticipation of meaning or significance. If 
the output of computer programs can masquerade as poetry, 
one reason is because contemporary poetic movements have 
opened the door for these texts to appear as such.
In such a tradition, language becomes concretized, 
"visible on the page, sounding at the level of each phoneme, 
so that the phonemes turning to morphemes turning to words 
turning to phrases turning to 'poem' is felt, heard, made 
tangible, palpable" (Bernstein 70). The disdain of Language
35
poets for "symbolic language and hidden layers of meaning" 
(Conte 274) produces a new, object-oriented process, through 
which "there is no separation of fact from language, no 
layering of discourse, no transport from one piane of 
existence to another--oniy the intricate play of/at the 
surface of language itself" (Conte 275) .
Since experiments in computer generated poetry reveal 
the current limitations of computer technology to produce 
texts that rely on subjective, encoded meaning (such as the 
narrative or thematic elements that occur in epic poetry), 
consideration of computer texts as poetry takes place both 
through a comparison of these texts to human products and 
the reader's recognition of certain "poetic" elements--a 
method which considers the text as object. Often the 
program, attempting to generate a balance between both 
traditional and the avant-garde forms, results in a "poem 
that is nothing but 'an object in and by itself' even though 
the programmer is trying to make the poem look not like such 
an object but like a traditional poem" (Newell 168). Using 
the failure, or more accurately the inability, of the 
computer to create a text imbued with discursive strata or 
signification as a dismissal of any poetic value in the text 
is only a result of certain established modes of 
interpretation; situating the output in both Modernist and 
contemporary traditions, I argue, allows the text a position
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as poetry. How individual programs utilize the two historic 
traditions of mechanical and chance production of texts 
differs from program to program; but to mimic the variegated 
results of the human creative process, all computer poetry 
programs must rely on the random manipulation of textual 
data. The next chapter explores this random process through 
the different taxonomies of computer poetry programs and 
their outputs, and examines how poetry by a machine can, in 
certain instances, confound our notions of authorship.
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Notes :
1. The satire of Addison and Steele's Spectator article 
relies heavily on the predominant codes of the literary 
hegemony at that time, the legacy of which still exists 
today in several facets of the production of literature, 
including academic canon formation, creative writing 
programs, and awards committee— all of which assign or 
maintain "literariness" in poetic works. The "author" of 
the article also satirizes those authors who assign merit by 
how quickly they finish a work, reaffirming the notion that 
art must be painstakingly produced over a lengthy period of 
gestation; and another who never prints his work but 
inscribes poems on the window glass of taverns with a 
diamond ring, and ceases writing forever when he loses his 
"Genius and his Ring to a Sharper at play" {Spectator 356). 
Of course, a computer can create text faster than any human, 
and could be considered as a tool similar to the diamond 
ring, and these reasons have been used to disparage computer 
poetry. Even though modern experiments in poetry and form 
allow the computer's output to pose as a human production, 
it appears that the theories of some critics have not 
changed in almost four hundred years.
2. Many critics disparage "Voyage to Laputa" as trite and 
ineffectual compared to the other travels of Gulliver, and 
several authorities, including W. A. Eddy, note that there
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"seems to be no motive for the story beyond a pointless and 
not too artfully contrived satire on mathematicians," and 
defer to assign Its creation to "one of Swift's literary 
Ideocyncracles [sic]" (Nicholson 110). Yet, Marjorie 
Nicholson suggests that this Is not the case:
The very fact that the literary and political 
background of Gulliver's Travels has been 
established so completely leads the Inquisitive 
reader to Inquire whether the unrecognizable 
sources of the Voyage to Laputa may not be equally 
capable of verification. If the most assiduous 
searcher Into sources can find 'no literary source 
or analogue' for the peculiar themes In this 
voyage alone, must not those sources be sought 
elsewhere than In the literary traditions Swift 
Inherited? {Science and Imagination 112)
3. In fact, Wittgenstein opposes the view that language can 
be reduced to explicit rules and formulas:
For remember that In general we don't use 
language according to strict rules--lt hasn't been 
taught us by means of strict rules, either. We,
In our discussions on the other hand, constantly 
compare language with a calculus proceeding to 
exact rules.
39
This is a very one-sided way of looking at 
language. In practice we rarely use language as 
such a calculus. For not only do we not think of 
the rules of usage--of definitions, etc.--while 
using language, but when we are asked to give such 
rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so. We 
are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we 
use; not because we don't know their real 
definition, but because there is no real 
'definition' to them. To suppose that there must 
be would be like supposing that whenever children 
play with a ball they play a game according to 
strict rules. {The Blue and the Brown Books 25)
4. ELIZA and PARRY are two examples of such programs.
Eliza, written by Joseph Weizenbaum in 1966, simulates a 
nondirective (i.e., Rogerian) psychotherapist. Ray Kurzweii, 
in The Age of Intelligent Machines, cites a commonly quoted 
example of its output:
Subject: Men are all alike.
ELIZA: IN WHAT WAYS
Subject: They're always bugging us about something 
or other.
ELIZA: CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 
Subject: Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
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ELIZA: YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
Subject: He says I'm depressed much of the time.
ELIZA: I AM SORRY TO HEAR THAT YOU ARE DEPRESSED
Subject: It's true. I'm unhappy.
ELIZA: DO YOU THINK COMING HERE WILL HELP YOU NOT
TO BE UNHAPPY... (Kurzweii 204)
Similarly, Kenneth Colby's program PARRY attempts to 
simulate a paranoid patient who believes the mafia is out to 
get him. When a group of psychiatrists were given a domain- 
specific Turing test (See Note 2.1), which involved PARRY 
and a real, live human suffering from paranoia, the 
psychiatrists did a little better than chance at 
distinguishing between the two (Kurzweii 54-5). These two
examples are given to show the limits of a computer's
"understanding" of language--in these cases, it consists of 
a program that formulates replies based on prompts in the 
input text.
5. The full text of Tzara's poem appears as a note after 
"How to Make a Dadaist Poem" as an example of his process. 
One must remember that not all Dadaist poems were created 
this way, yet nevertheless it shares remarkable affinities 
to several computer generated poems discussed in Chapter Two 
regarding semantic and syntactical confusion in the output. 
Tzara's poem reads:
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when dogs cross the air in a diamond like 
ideas and the appendix of the meninx tells the 
time of the alarm programme (the title is mine) 
prices they are yesterday suitable next 
pictures/appreciate the dream era of the 
eyes/pompously that to recite the gospel sort 
darkens/group apotheosis imagine said he fatality 
power of colours/carved flies (in the theatre) 
flabbergasted reality a delight/spectator all to 
effort of the no more 10 to 12/during divagination 
twirls descends pressure/render some mad single­
file flesh on a monstrous crushing stage/celebrate 
but their adherents in steps on put my 
nacreous/sumptuous of land bananas sustained 
illuminate/joy ask together almost/of has the a 
such that the invoked visions/some sings latter 
laughs/exits situation disappears describes she 25 
dance bows/dissimulated the whole of it isn't 
was/magnificent ascent has the band better light 
whose lavishness stage music-halls me/reappears 
following instant moves live/business he didn't 
has lent/manner words come these people. (Tzara 
39)
6. With typical predilection for overblown performance, the
figureheads of the Dadaist movement held a formal ceremony
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to lay Dada to rest: "In May 1922 Tzara, Van Doesburg, Arp, 
Schwitters, and Richter held a funeral service for Dada at 
the Bauhaus festival in Weimar. Dada, as a concerted 
activity, had ceased" (Erickson 119).
7. Throughout this paper, I use the more contemporary term 
"Language" rather than the more awkward and dated spelling 
of "L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E."
8. An embodiment of traditional poetic discourse 
encountering the work of either Dada or Language poetry can 
be found in Wittgenstein's observation that "The confusions 
which occupy us arise when language is like an engine 
idling, not when it is doing work" {Philosophical 
Investigations 132).
9. In a personal letter to a fellow poet regarding the 
creation of mistakes in his work Words nd Ends from Ez, Mac 
Low responds :
The making of mistakes is the true intervention of 
unsystematic chance, and as such one might think 
that I ought to accept it, or even welcome it.
I'm of at least three minds about it. "Reading- 
through methods" are not chance operations even 
though they are nonintentional insofar as I cannot 
know ahead of time or determine consciously what 
words, etc., will enter the texts produced by 
means of them. In principle they are
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"deterministic" (as my astrophysicist son puts it) 
even though they are intentionally nonintentional 
in the above sense.
But determinism is fucked up by the mind and
its lapses and by my never having time enough to
check and recheck them. So be it. It is better 
(and more "Buddhist") to accept them after a 
certain period of time. (Letter to Karin Schalm, 
1994)
10. What may appear as a single layer of discourse in fact 
consists of many intertextual relations, notably that of 
poetry theory, programming theory, and the individual 
contributions of programmer and operator. This is discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter. For Conte, Language 
poets produce texts that appear as non-intertextual entities 
and in one sense, this attempt succeeds--although this
implicates theories of reading and whether meaning in a poem
lies in the text or in the reader.
Chapter 2 : The Generation of Text
"Poetry is what Milton saw when he went blind."
--Don Marquis, quoted in
E. Anthony, O Rare Don Marquis
In the early 1960s, researchers in artificial 
intelligence began to experiment with programs that could 
parse sentences and create phrases, with the goal of 
eventually producing a computer capable of understanding 
human speech and writing. Ultimately, such a program would 
have command of the language to a degree that it would be 
able to answer questions from a human interrogator in a 
variety of subjects, and deceive the human judge into 
believing that the computer was an actual human being.
Known as the Turing test,  ̂ this exam has become the holy 
grail for AI researchers, and some even speculate that a 
computer will pass this test as early as 2020 (Kurzweii 
483). Known as natural language programming, this area of 
computer science dealing with language recognition and 
understanding was the initial birthplace for computer 
generated poetry programs. Although these early programs 
produced semantically stilted language and their form was 
limited to correct sentences, they impressed their 
programmers by occasionally creating coherent text. Most of 
these initial experiments were limited to haiku generating
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programs, and often were products of more "serious" research 
proj ects.
But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the introduction 
of the desktop personal computer produced a wave of 
dilettante programming hobbyists able to compose, mostly in 
BASIC, a wide variety of applications in their living 
rooms. Before this time, access to and production of these 
programs was confined to those who could afford the space 
and cost of large mainframes— mostly large research 
corporations and universities. With the new technology of 
home computers, novel attempts were made to manipulate and 
produce texts, and out of these efforts, several rudimentary 
poetry generating programs emerged. But the limits of this 
new technology, including slow processing speed, limited 
language applications, and inadequate storage space and 
memory, soon became apparent and most forays into natural 
language processing in the home were stalled, abandoned, or 
dismissed. In the past fifteen years, personal computers 
have become so powerful so quickly that a new interest in 
the computer production of text now appears to be emerging. 
Yet, even with new advances in hardware and software, 
natural language programming and artificial intelligence 
have still not produced a computer able to "know" what words 
represent (outside of Is and Os) in the way that any human 
does. Therefore, even the latest programs today utilize one
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of two systems of generation that were well-implemented by 
the mid-1980s. These two systems, as the last chapter 
illustrates, have an established tradition in the arts, and 
both incorporate an aleatory function to produce output. 
Louis T. Milic, one of the early optimists of computer 
generated poetry, labels these two different systems as 
formulary and derivative {Princeton 230).
The primary difference between these two methods lies 
in the source of textual elements. Formulaic systems 
operate with lists of words, often grouped by parts of 
speech and predetermined by the programmer or operator, 
while derivative programs rearrange existing input texts 
according to certain sequences of probability. Sometimes 
known as "text mangiers," derivative programs allow the 
possibility of combining Shakespeare's sonnets with Pound's 
cantos. As simple as these two classifications sound, the 
application of each method varies greatly within this 
taxonomy, necessitating a closer analysis of each method and 
its proponents. Since these differences become crucial to 
understanding the complexity of "authorship" in computer 
generated poetry, I will compare a few selected programs 
from each case and present their output for consideration.
Formulaic programs combine words according to templates 
established by the programmer; these templates appear as the 
equations that govern sentence construction. One template
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might appear as simple as "Noun+Verb" or as complicated as 
''Article+Noun+Verb+Preposition+Article+Noun," the latter of 
which might create "The cat sits on the rock" just as easily 
as "A cars eats at the tree." More sophisticated programs 
use templates that designate tense and number in an attempt 
to eliminate the semantic disagreement of the second result, 
while some may even use a rudimentary thesaurus to select 
parts of speech appropriate to the subj ect--miIk, dog, or 
kitten, but not blue or cloud might accompany or modify 
"cat"— but it does not require much consideration to realize 
how this could severely limit the output while still 
producing errors. To be effective, the staggering number of 
semantic connections necessary would have to rival the 
network of the human brain's ten billion neurons.
Considering that each of these neurons could have up to 
200,000 separate entry ports, or connections to other 
neurons, configuring an artificial brain for language lies 
far beyond today's technological boundaries {Godel 340) .̂
One of the most famous formulaic programs, Racter 
(short for raconteur) by Bill Chamberlain and Thomas Etter, 
claims to incorporate a primitive thesaurus, while also 
earning recognition as one of the oldest of the second 
generation of poetry programs that began in the early 
1980s. In 1984, Chamberlain compiled Racter's output into 
The Policeman's Beard is Half-Constructed^ a text that
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spurred a flurry of anticipation about the computer's
potential to create prose and poetry. In his preface,
Chamberlain claims: "With the exception of this
introduction, the writing in this book was all done by a 
computer," and that "the programmer is removed to a very 
great extent from the specific form of the system's output. 
This output is no longer of a preprogrammed form. Rather, 
the computer forms output on its own" (Chamberlain 
[introduction]).
Following such assertions, the reader encounters such 
seemingly intelligent work as:
A hot and torrid bloom which
Fans wise flames and begs to be
Redeemed by forces black and strong 
Will now oppose my naked will 
And force me into regions of despair.
(Chamberlain 7)
Chamberlain points out that his program has the ability to 
assign a "variable" status to certain randomly chosen words 
and use them at key points in the text; the resulting output 
of this process appears :
to spin a thread of what might initially pass for 
coherent thinking throughout the computer­
generated copy so that once the program is run, 
its output is not only new and unknowable, it is
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apparently thoughtful. It is crazy "thinking," I 
grant you, but "thinking" that is expressed in 
perfect English. (Chamberlain [Introduction]) 
Computer programmer Jorn Barger, on the other hand, 
indicates that "only the most generous interpretation of 
these claims will hold up under close scrutiny" (Barger). 
What appears as coherent syntax, Barger claims correctly, 
exists because of prewritten templates in which Racter only 
substitutes a small number of elements. In fact, many 
sentences or lines in some examples do not contain any 
variable elements, leading Barger to conclude that the style 
of the text belongs not to Racter, but to Chamberlain.  ̂
Unfortunately, this information, coupled with the popularity 
of Racter, has either led to an inaccurate and widespread 
disparaging of all computer-generated texts or to the quick 
assumption that sole authorship of the output belongs to the 
programmer.
In Poetry CreatOR, Erik Sincoff modifies Racter's 
approach by introducing more randomization and prompting the 
user for certain elements such as title, subject, and a 
synonym. Rather than utilize one template for the entire 
text, Sincoff^ s program consists of many possible templates 
for each line, grouped by lines one through nine, yet chosen 
at random from within those groups. Between one and four 
variables exist in each line, and each variable further
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limits the selection field by defining the subdivision of 
each category. Sincoff arranges verbs, for example, by 
violence, movement, noises, thinking, or temper, and 
adjectives by color, emotion, speed, or shape.
Once running, the program selects the first line from a 
data list of possible first line templates such as:
"$VERB3$!" $VERB2t$ the $ADJ1$ man, the keeper of $SUBJp$
The numbers after the variables indicate which group the 
program chooses from: three and two represent thinking and 
noise verbs respectively. In my experiment, I chose to have 
the program select a subject at random, (although I could 
have input one of my own) which produced : "Remember!" spoke
the agitated man, the keeper of monkeys. The following text 
represents a full sample output :
The arguing pair fantasize with a sorrowful ear 
Stalking nothing like it was yesterday--just like 
a ceilo.
Ever briskly, the leg took its toll. . .
Eating wolves as snack food, the lurking mass 
blocked the sun 
My favorite thing is typing "Marie Antoinette is a 
Virgin" on your depressed face 
Never remembered. . . never more has been argued
Hope for you is not a morning dove, rather a 
mourning dictator
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From a height high above, the preacher grasped the 
orange.
O melancholy world, you have operated me again. 
Although Sincoff's program only produces nine lines of 
output, each of those lines may have up to four variable 
elements allowing Poetry CreatOR to accomplish more than 
Racter. Sincoff's program improves upon Racter-styLe 
programming by increasing randomization, and although there 
still exists "echoes" of human influence, the technique 
increases the distance between the programmer and the actual 
output.
The appropriately titled DadaPoem Generator by Alex 
Chachanashvili represents one of the most simple 
applications of formulaic programming, yet provides the most 
distance between the programmer and the text because it 
fully randomizes each discreet unit of text. Beginning with 
a data list of templates, the program "fills in the blanks" 
with data from lists of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, 
conjunctions, and prepositions. Once started, the program 
selects a template such as %A_%ving_%n_%vs_%J_%n%x and 
begins to insert the proper information, where "a" 
represents an adverb, "v" a verb, "n" a noun, "j" an 
adjective, and "x" a random punctuation mark. Capital 
letters indicate that the article "a" or "an" should precede 
the selected term, while an underscore represents a space
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and the percent sign separates terms in the sequence. The 
program only recognizes the first term after the percent 
symbol as a search string, adding any additional characters 
which follow. For example, the first verb in the above 
template would appear in the present tense with an "ing" 
ending. The whole line yields, in actual output: "a 
beautifully thinking poet sees a soft woman!" With carriage 
returns as a possible template choice, the program may 
randomly introduce blank lines which the operator might use 
to group the output into stanzas. Yet, while always 
grammatically correct, the output rarely appears 
semantically coherent. From hundreds of lines of output, 
one of the more sensible groupings appears as:
An angry writer remorselessly writes 
About an old glass
A poem deliberately mangles shoes.
Walking--
A woman sweeps the blue and violet skies 
Dissonantly felt, because people listen sexually 
A verdant devil abruptly drives over loneliness.
An angry watch 
Mirrors a city, and further 
A decayed feeling about mirrors sings 
A thought that rarely comes on poems.'’
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Even though illusory, the serendipitous appearance of 
"writer" with the appropriate verb "writes" in the first 
line combines with the line breaks to mimic traditional 
human elements of language and poetic construction. Random 
selection produces the former, while templates of partial 
sentences create the appearance of enjambed text. With a 
word-processing program, I modified the vocabulary data 
lists, omitting such words as "brain tissue" and "monster 
truck" in favor of traditional, and perhaps hackneyed, 
poetic terms such as "thought," "heart," and "emotion." My 
conclusion : abstract nouns seem less constricted in 
association than concrete ones, producing more semantically 
plausible constructions.
One final example of formulaic programming produces 
output that combines the coherence of Racter with the degree 
of randomization DadaPoems offers.  ̂ Created by Chris 
Westbury, McPoet uses templates with built-in randomization 
of their elements so that the templates themselves change 
each time the program selects them. In order to accomplish 
its humorous title screen boast of "Doing for poetry what 
McDonald's has done for food," McPoet randomizes the 
appearance of certain elements by dictating the probability 
of that element appearing in the template. For example, one 
template reads : 100 "do" 100 "not" 90 "simply" 10
p_verbs_from 100 macroReturnSpacing 50 adjectives 50 p_nouns
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100 punctuate 70. The numbers following each variable 
indicate the percentage chance of that unit appearing in the 
output. "Do" will appear 100% of the time, while "not" will 
follow 90% of the time, and 10% of all runs of this template 
will contain the modifier "simply." Both the subject and 
verb, which agree in number, will appear every time although 
the actual nouns and verbs substituted will be randomly 
chosen each time. Interestingly, of the four programs 
mentioned, only McPoet randomly manipulates the outward form 
of the text by implementing a random line break, in this 
case, the template will output as one line only 50% of the 
time, and every other instance as two. McPoet also allows 
the operator to determine the number of lines, the subject, 
and the subject's gender. This ability to influence the 
output directly becomes crucial when one realizes that the 
program does not accommodate neuter subjects, only masculine 
and feminine. Therefore, to appear coherent, the operator 
must use names, occupations, or objects with conventional 
genderings. (Ronald Reagan as male, earth and nature as 
female, and poet or author as either.) Such varying 
probability often produces mixed results, one line 
insightfully reads, "Derrida loves awhile, he understands 
absolutely and ritually/his pert fad" while, with "poet" as 
feminine subject, the program produces the comical:
A poet splashes.
55
she buzzes,
many big deadly cents excavate.
Her big black old baboon is like the chaste nubile 
extroverted delicacy, 
it sings to us,
her song is like innumerable offensive 
adorations.
Only three lines were requested at the start; one can easily 
see that McPoet's ability to produce random line breaks adds 
the illusion of human intention, although the content of the 
text itself appears absurd.
Formulaic poetry generating programs produce texts 
influenced by two individuals : the programmer and the 
operator. One could argue that they are one in the same, 
since by inputting data such as subject and gender, the 
operator enters into the role of programmer and "finishes" 
the instruction set. It would follow that in such a case, 
the label "programmer" now applies to a role and not to a 
specific individual. Much to the possible disappointment of 
the Bill Chamberlains and Chris Westburys of the programming 
world, authorship now disintegrates into a true author 
"function," not applicable to identifiable individuals. Yet 
somehow this creates a nagging sense of inaccuracy precisely 
because of the type of language computer programmers use.
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We may put the term author in quotes when we refer to 
composer of Paradise Lost or Leaves of Grass, because the 
language of those works differs substantially from the 
language used to create computer programs. Languages such 
as BASIC and LISP evolved out of symbolic mathematical 
language in use since the 17th century. In natural (human) 
language, the sign may be arbitrary and ambiguous as many 
theorists posit, but in formal (computer or symbolic) 
language the sign explicitly represents an operation. 
Therefore the intent of the author in a section of 
programming code is always obvious, so that interpretation 
of the sign never necessitates interaction with culture or 
society. Ferdinand de Saussure was one of the first 
linguists to realize this; in his Course in General 
Linguistics, Saussure points out that "one characteristic of 
the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not 
empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between 
the signifier and the signified" (Saussure 73). Unless 
modified by someone else, the symbolic language (the 
program) of McPoet always exists as Chris Westbury's, yet in 
interacting with Westbury's program the operator creates a 
situation not where Westbury's contribution cannot be 
determined, but rather, the operator now becomes co­
programmer with the original author.
This relationship in the co-authoring of the program
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creates a level of textual discourse that lies beneath and 
preexists the actual output of the program. This discourse- 
below-discourse most certainly affects both how the computer 
will create its "poem" and what this work will contain-- 
similar to the manner in which human poetic discourse and 
theory influences the way human poets compose their work. 
Likewise, although the computer itself may not experience an 
"anxiety of influence" in its production of text, the 
programmer attempts to create a program whose output 
emulates the form of existing poetries--indicating some 
degree of a relationship between poetic and programming 
discourses.
Yet in these formulaic programs, the inclusion of a 
random generator complicates a co-programmer relationship at 
the level of output. The programmer creates an instruction 
set and vocabulary data lists, the operator sets parameters 
and may supply additional elements, but the machine itself 
manipulates the output randomly--three distinct, yet 
sometimes individually undefinable, contributions to any 
given output. Computer generating programs of the other 
classification, the derivative variety, further complicate 
this tripartite arrangement because they produce exactly 
what their name implies: text derived from other texts.
Most derivative programs work in much the same way that
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Tzara's paper bag does, yet they incorporate methods of 
analysis that help reduce the number of incompatible 
phrasings. Famed literary critic Hugh Kenner, along with 
Joseph O'Rourke, created one of the most famous derivative 
programs in 1984. Named Travesty, Kenner and Rourke's 
program reads an input text according to a "Order" that the 
operator assigns:
If the order is 4, it seeks out every occurrence 
of the initial 4-character seguence and records 
the character that comes after. It then chooses 
at random from its notepad one character to 
append, moves forward one place, [and] repeats the 
whole process. (Hartman 77)
Charles Hartman and Kenner used Travesty, along with 
Hartman's Diastext, to produce a work called Sentences in 
1995, in which the input text contains 457 nineteenth- 
century grammar examples from the Thayer Street Grammar 
School (Providence, RI) composed by Samuel Green and known 
as "Sentences for Analysis and Parsing" (Hartman 79). After 
reading the 3,250 word text, consisting of such examples as 
the title itself, "School begins," "Dogs barked," and "John 
will forget," Travesty produces an initial output according 
to the order chosen. One such output appears like this:
Sentences for Analysis and Parsing Thayer Street 
Grammar School begins. James, bring me the vessel
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had been using that that. Our little lame. He 
hurricane. The love of money is to prepare 
forsaken. Iron has brought it tremble. The young
must do it is. (Hartman 7)
Rather than accept this output as final, Kenner and Hartman 
input this output into another program modeled on Jackson
Mac Low's diastic technique of verse composition. Diastext^
authored as mentioned above by Hartman, composes works in 
the same way as Mac Low creates "Ridiculous in Piccadilly." 
Using the above output from Travesty, Hartman's program 
systematically produces:
Sentences begins.
money must
Sentences
Parsing
Sentences
Sentences
Sentences for love forsaken.
Analysis and 
Thayer
Analysis money
Analysis
Analysis
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Analysis and 
Analysis and 
Parsing 
James,
Our forsaken. (11. 1-17)
Diastext continues until it has reached the end of 
Travesty s output. Kenner posits that this final text 
demands to be read aloud; the repetition produces a rhythm 
which "implies Chant, therefore Voice" and he notes "a 
setting for massed choirs and soloists is not inconceivable" 
(Hartman 82). Interestingly, the end result evolves from 
several initial sources: Hartman's selection of Green's 
hundred-year-old list, Kenner and O'Rourke's Travesty, and 
Hartman's Diastext. Green's list becomes the output of 
Travesty, which in turn becomes the source text for 
Diastext, and the reader finds the final output bearing very 
little resemblance to the original.
In a somewhat similar manner, Stefan Strack's Mark V. 
Shaney reads an input text or texts and builds a "word 
probability table" that reflects the probability of a given 
word following a sequence of words (Strack). The program 
initially views the text according to the "word grain"-- 
which represents the number of words to be read as a unit.
If the word grain is "2," the program first builds a table 
of all the words in the text by groups of two: the first and
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second words, the second and third words, the third and 
fourth words, etc. Once completed, the program then 
calculates the probability of a third word following each 
two-word group, stores that information, and chooses a word 
cluster at random--producing text according to highest 
probability, stopping only when it reaches the last word of 
the input text. With a word grain of "2" the output closely 
resembles the input; change the word grain to "1" and the 
text becomes fully, yet systematically, mangled from a 
random starting point. Since the program recognizes 
punctuation as part of the word, the product appears 
remarkably grammatical.
The same method of probabilistic determination drives 
Neil Rubenking's Brekdown,^ inspired by Travesty and similar 
to Mark y. Shaney except that it works on the level of the 
character rather than the word. Using Brekdown, John 
Tranter creates texts derived from the work of both Matthew 
Arnold and John Ashberry (Tranter). After reading a 
continuous input text from Arnold's "The Buried Life,"
"Dover Beach," and "The Scholar-Gypsy" Brekdown produces 
output from which Tranter culls several lines. Of the 
thirty-four lines he presents, one notices a striking levei 
of coherency not previously attained with other programs:
From the dying pastoral slopes an unwanted earth art 
gone
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And the vast edges draw back the impulse of an 
hour--
Exhausted, thou waitest for one desire, and the soft 
Abstractions of reapers in the intellectual trough. 
So wild brother men, concealed then with distracted 
air--
Let it be spent on other -joy, and we.
Wanderer one of antique shadow, rest 
And in the bluebell-drenched days, men 
Who in the sun, thy fire their being roll.
Come Shepard, bathe in our war of antique shadow, 
'Tis this story of the wooden bridge, wrapt in 
disguise. (11. 19-29)
Using two anagrams of "Matthew Arnold," Tranter titles the 
work "What Mortal End" and attributes authorship to "Tom 
Haltwarden." While the jumbled nature of the anagram may 
aptly represent the process of composition, to what degree 
does this output text belong to Matthew Arnold? The 
apparent fluidity of the output can be deceptive, for 
Tranter himself indicates that he edits the output, 
gathering "the thirty or so 'best lines' of that raw text" 
and "clean[ing] them up a bit to make them less garbled" 
(Tranter).
Whereas the question of authorship becomes troubling 
enough in formulaic programming, it becomes even more so in
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a derivative process. The above example combines the 
written program of Rubenking, the diction and structure as 
created by three of Arnold's poems, and the editing skills 
of Tranter. And much like a co-authored human work where 
each individual's contribution may be difficult to discern, 
one can easily imagine how indistinct each individual's 
contribution might become in derivative programming, 
especially if the input text comprises the work of more than 
one author--does that appearance of "science" refer to 
Milton's use or Poe's?
So why apply the fictitious name of one person to 
Tranter's exampie rather than title it "Output #1" by "Neil 
Rubenking, Matthew Arnold, and John Tranter"? Besides 
raising the issue of how, in 1992, John Tranter and Neil 
Rubenking can co-author a text with a man dead for over a 
hundred years, this process implicates the question of 
ownership in a capitalistic society. Supposing this text 
becomes marketable as poetry, would royalties be paid to 
everyone involved--the operator Tranter, the programmer 
Rubenking (who may be unaware that his program composed such 
a text), and the owner of the rights to Arnold's work, a 
poet who, since he died in 1888 most certainly remains 
unaware of his contribution?
Although Arnold may not be the best example in this 
case because of American copyright law, what if we replaced
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Arnold with a poet still alive, or only dead for a few 
years? In light of the way we often attribute ownership to 
human authors, this question of who we credit with 
authorship may seem rhetorical to some. Traditionally, we 
discount the texts of multiple authors, such as the 
"exquisite corpse" projects of the Dadaists, because of the 
method of production and the difficulty in determining each 
individual's intent and contribution. Curiously, it seems 
that the way that "group" poetries are composed results in 
their output being treated as non-serious or non- 
intentional, much like computer poetry— so long as we know 
how they were produced. These texts thwart attempts to 
define authorial intent because the work is not seen as a 
unified whole; it is not a product of one individual's 
efforts which contains the voice and intent of that 
individual.  ̂ Even in "found" poetry (where the author finds 
the poem as text preexisting on such mundane objects as 
newspapers, parking tickets, or cereal boxes) or texts that 
contain highly intertextual material, we tend to assign 
authorship to the individual who claims responsibility for 
"finding" these texts and assembling them in a certain way. 
But in computer poetry, the process by which one "finds" 
this poetry consists of selecting the input texts and 
sifting through mountains of output and deciding what will 
make it off the screen into print--and each operator's ideas
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of what a poem is and what it should look like obviously 
influence this decision.
So, in accordance with accepted convention, having an 
imaginary author or anagram attached to Tranter's example 
allows the text to attempt to conceal its origins and 
present itself as a possible human construction.
Admittedly, as readers encountering a text with an 
unrecognizable name, we usually default to the assumption 
that it is a human construction--but can one distinguish the 
computer's output from the human works it imitates?
Using output from his Kurzweil Computer Poet, Raymond 
Kurzweil composed a domain-specific Turing Test to see to 
what extent people could detect computer texts from the work 
of human poets. After selecting stanzas from four human 
poets (Percy Shelley, T. S. Eliot, William Carlos Williams, 
and Kurzweil himself), Kurzweil produced output using an 
input text created from poems by these same authors and 
asked participants to judge whether they thought a computer 
or a human composed each stanza. Some of the more easily 
recognizable human contributions, such as Eliot's "I should 
have been a pair of ragged claws/scuttling across the floors 
of silent seas" appear interspersed with the computer's "O 
thou,/Who moved among some fierce Maenad, even noise and 
blue/Between the bones sang, scattered and the silent seas." 
(Lines produced by mangling the work of Eliot and Shelley.)
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Although his survey group was small, including only thirteen 
adults and three children, and does not indicate whether any 
of the judges were professional poetry readers or scholars, 
the results indicate that the judges were correct, on 
average, only 63% of the time (Kurzweil 377), Considering 
that the simple rule of chance between two choices produces 
at least a 50% probability, it appears the computer stanzas 
often deceived the judges successfully.
If this program truly succeeds in producing texts which 
can deceive readers into believing that some human authored 
them, then it appears that the way we have traditionally 
viewed the relation between poetry and authorship needs to 
be reconsidered. But before we assert such a claim, we need 
a larger study of these texts and the human responses to 
them, preferably with a survey that does not include 
children and focuses on respondents familiar with poetry and 
poetic form. Such a study also needs to include output from 
more than one computer generating program, in order to test 
the field as a whole, and to determine which programs have a 
greater success rate.
As we have seen, the programs mentioned in this chapter 
vary widely both in their methods and output, and to devise 
an accurate method of testing a poem for the nature of its 
authorship will most likely prove impossible, given the 
human tradition of subverting genre and form distinctions.
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In other words, what would prevent a human poet from 
imitating computer output? With the evolving sophistication 
of the programs available today, and those available in the 
future, it appears increasing evident that computer 
generated poetry can no longer be dismissed as a passing 
fad.
68
Notes :
1. The Turing test derives its name and methodology from 
Alan Turing, a mathematician and computer specialist who, in 
1950, wrote "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" in which 
he proposed the following test of a computer's intelligence 
(Kurzweil 48). In one room, a human judge sits at a 
terminal connected to two other terminals in one or more 
rooms. At one of the two terminals is a human, the other is 
connected to a computer, and the human judge must determine 
by the answers to a series of questions via teletype which 
respondent is the computer and which is the human. This 
test considers the computer to be "intelligent" if it 
succesfully stumps the judge.
Since the judge can ask any question he or she wants, 
including questions designed to elicit responses concerning 
emotions, feelings, and even ask jokes, etc., it comes as no 
suprise that no computer has yet passed this test. But 
researchers have successfully used "domain-specific" 
versions of this test to establish a computer's expertise in 
highly focused and specific areas, such as answering math 
questions or imitating paranoid schizophrenics (see note 
1.4).
2. Even if one could devise such a language map, AI 
philosopher Hubert Dreyfus notes that the ability to 
understand and learn language necessitates intelligence as
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an "embodied" form (Dreyfus 255). An artificial language 
map would appear as a set of rules for usage, yet Dreyfus 
argues that our associations to and meanings within language 
arise from having the sensory input of our physical bodies, 
not from a rigid rule book. This implies that for any AI 
computer to be able to "understand" and use language 
correctly, it must have senses and mobility egual to that of 
a human being--it must be able to move about and experience 
the world, not sit on a desk on in a laboratory. Similarly 
Wittgenstein also maintains that the idea of an artificial 
catalogue runs opposite to our everyday experience of 
language. (See Note 1.3)
3. Barger quotes the following exampie to illustrate his 
point. The actual Policeman's Beard 'output':
At all events my own essays and dissertations 
about love and its endless pain and perpetual 
pleasure will be known and understood by all of 
you who read this and talk or sing or chant about 
it to your worried friends or nervous enemies.
Love is the question and the subject of this 
essay. We will commence with a question: does 
steak love lettuce? This question is implacably 
hard and inevitably difficult to answer. Here is 
a question : does an electron love a proton, or 
does it love a neutron? Here is a question : does
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a man love a woman or, to be specific and to be 
precise, does Bill love Diane? The interesting 
and critical response to this question is: no! He 
is obsessed and infatuated with her. He is loony 
and crazy about her. That is not the love of 
steak and lettuce, of electron and proton and 
neutron. This dissertation will show that the 
love of a man and a woman is not the love of steak 
and lettuce. Love is interesting to me and 
fascinating to you but it is painful to Bill and 
Diane. That is love! (Chamberlain [3])
According to Barger, the actual underlying template appears 
as :
Key :
<text variables>
(redundancies explicitly added by Chamberlain, by 
repeating a text-variable type, apparently for 
camouflage)
<Intro phrase> my own (essays) about love and its 
(endless) pain and pleasure will be (understood) 
by all of you who read this and (talk) about it to 
your (<worried> <friends>). Love is the (subject) 
of this <essay>- We will <begin> with a question: 
does <meat> love <vegetable>? This question is
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(<implacably> <hard>) to answer. (Here is a 
question: does a man love a woman or, (to be 
specific), does <man> love woman>?) The 
(interesting) response to this question is: no!
(He is (infatuated) with her.) That is not the 
love (of <meat> and <vegetable>). This <essay> 
will show that the love of a man and a woman is 
not the love of <meat> and <vegetable>- Love is 
(interesting) to me and you but it is painful to 
<man> and <woman>. That is love I (Barger 1)
4. I have edited this by capitalizing the first letter of 
each line and by correcting "feeled" to "felt" in line 
three.
5. Several other generating programs exist, most notably 
those formulaic varieties that produce haiku verse. In the 
late 1960s, Margaret Masterman and Robin McKinnon Wood 
generated the short, three-line verse form on a computer at 
the Cambridge Language Research Unit. Using a simple 
schema, it constructed : "All green in the leaves/I smell 
dark pools in the trees/crash the moon has fled." Two 
decades later, programs such as Haiku Master by Andrew Stone 
still create text in approximately the same fashion : "[T]he 
inner sun/attempts summer stillness./O cloistered 
ineffable!" Because these programs exclusively compose in 
haiku verse form, and have not evolved noticeably since
72
their conception, I have not attended to this subdivision 
here .
6. Although I was unable to procure a copy of Brekdown--not 
even Rubenking himself has a copy of the program--! sampled 
a similar shareware program entitled Babble! by Tracey 
Siesser, Lee Horowitz, and Jim Korenthal, which appears to 
produce output in a similar fashion.
7. A large number of textbooks and other "literal" or 
nonfiction works contain several authors, often listed and 
explicitly claiming multiple authorship. (Indeed, many 
"autobiographies" of several celebrities utilize the talents 
of professional writers.) But it is interesting to note 
that fiction and poetry (because they are seen as more 
intentional, perhaps?) almost exclusively contain single 
authors.
Chapter III: Postformalism or Deception?: Discerning the 
Author/Reader Relationship in Computer Generated Poetry
"A poem need not have a meaning and like most 
things in nature often does not have."
--Wallace Stevens, "Adagia"
As computer generated poetry programs become more 
sophisticated, their impact on the poetry community may 
become difficult to discern or measure. For both poets and 
academics, the ability of the computer to produce poetic 
text raises several issues dealing primarily with the need 
to define what constitutes "poetry." Raymond Kurzweil's 
small survey mentioned in the last chapter pitted his text- 
mangling program, Kurweil Computer Poet^ against the works 
of T. S. Eliot, Percy Bysshe Shelley, William Carlos 
Williams, and his own non-computer verse. His respondents 
answered correctly little more than half the time--better 
than pure guessing, but still not a convincing win for human 
poets.
In fact, Kurzweil's study should not be extrapolated to 
conclusions about all computer poetry programs; rather, a 
more accurate study of computer generated poetry needs to 
take into account a larger portion of the field of available 
programs. Additionally, as noted in the last chapter, 
Kurzweil's study of only sixteen individuals included three 
children, and several respondents replied that they did not 
have much experience with poetry. A computer may appear
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capable of deceiving those with limited exposure or interest 
in poetry, but could the same program or others accomplish 
similar results if the individuals surveyed possessed a high 
degree of poetic knowledge?
In an attempt to determine the actual quality (what 
some might call "usefulness") of computer generated poetry,
I composed a survey of poems (or stanzas if the poem 
appeared too large to quote in full) composed by both human 
poets and the programs I illustrated in the previous 
chapter.  ̂ Of the fifteen examples, eight were composed by 
either Haiku Master, DadaPoem Generator, Travesty, Kurzweil 
Computer Poet, McPoet, Poetry Generator, or Brekdown. The 
human poets ranged from Language poets Ted Greenwald, Clark 
Coolidge, and Jackson Mac Low to more well-known, 
anthologized poets such as T. S. Eliot and Amiri Baraka.
A total of thirty-seven students and professors at the 
University of Montana responded, and since all currently 
study literature or creative writing, I expected results far 
less encouraging for the computer than Kurzweil's survey 
received. Since none of my respondents are children and 
most replied that they read poetry occasionally or most of 
the time, I anticipated that a large percentage of these 
students, poets, and academics would immediately discern the 
sheep's clothing of the computer texts. But the results 
showed quite the opposite, with the entire field of
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respondents answering correctly only 46.2% of the time and 
the highest individual number of correct answers tallying 
eleven of fifteen.  ̂ Does this domain-specific version of 
the Turing Test prove that the output of a computer program 
appears indistinguishable from that of a human poet? Before 
trying to answer that question, we first need to review the
methodology I applied to construct my survey.
Obviously, the results would differ if I had selected 
some of Shakespeare's sonnets and contrasted them with 
nonsensical output from a text-mangling program. But since 
the responding field was comprised by students and teachers 
of literature, and the object of the survey was to seek 
conclusions based on analysis of the textual elements in 
each example, the examples themselves could not contain 
easily recognizable work of any given author. Such examples 
test an individual's memory, not their analytical ability. 
But, in fairness, the human examples came from humans 
recognized as poets, rather than from dubious sources. Two
factors influenced the process through which I selected 
human works from collections or anthologies. First, since 
chance plays such a large role in computer output, it 
follows that the longer the output, the greater the 
opportunity for the computer to reveal its random processes 
and for the text to lose the illusion it attempts to 
create. Also, what I perceived as iimits on the size of the
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survey, both in copying costs and respondents' interest 
levels, precluded the quotation of large blocks of text.
The second factor arises from semantic problems. Since 
most individuals have a preconceived conception of the 
random nature of the computer program, they may assume that 
any text constructed in a syntactically and semantically 
correct way must have been composed by a human. But since 
the metaphoric nature of poetry allows for a reader to 
understand or interpret a semantically awkward phrase from a 
human poet, an individual may base his or her answer not on 
how much sense a poem contains, but how much sense can be 
attributed to it. With these two factors on mind I applied 
something of a role reversal : I chose those human poems that 
might appear to be computer ones, and chose computer poems 
that resembled human output, resulting in an "average"-- 
examples that could easily appear as one or the other.
If one considers that a blindfolded respondent has a 
50% chance of guessing the correct answer, then those 
surveyed answered correctly at less than chance— indicating 
that the individuals surveyed established their decision on 
a set of criteria to which each example either matched or 
did not. For this criteria, two possible positions exist: 
one, the idea of how a computer poem might appear, or two, 
the idea of what a human poem should look like. Since none 
of the individuals surveyed answered all the questions
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correctly, one can assume that whatever the reader 
establishes as criteria must be subjective and not 
objective. Amazingly, T . S. Eiiot--one of the more famous 
poets in our language--was mistaken for a computer by almost 
one-third of respondents. Combine this with four out of 
five people assuming the output of McPoet as a human 
construction, and one can see present difficulty in 
determining where some modern poetry might come from.
Yet, this difficulty in recognizing human authors from 
computer ones may not appear important if the reader 
approaches the text in a certain way, because the results of 
this localized survey indict certain methods of interpreting 
poetry. Faced with the challenge that computer poetry 
offers to those theories that primarily focus on the author, 
whether biographical, psychoanalytical, or historical, 
critics have disparaged computer generated texts. The most 
fervent protest comes from those arguing for the 
communicative nature of an author-reader relationship and 
from critics wishing to preserve a "high culture" perception 
of the art. Considering that poetry has long "been 
considered a wasteful thing for an able-bodied man to do, 
when he could be earning a living in a more serious way" as 
Louis T. Milic notes, the reaction to computers infiltrating 
what some consider the domain of humans seems slightly 
ironic (Milic 169).
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Nevertheless, in "Speculative Equations: Poems, Poets, 
Computers" Howard Nemerov introduces his discussion of
computer generated poetry by questioning whether or not
computers can even write poetry, and suggests that such a 
question appears to "indeed look new. . . as well as faintly
silly" (Nemerov 394). If anything should strike one as 
amusing in his naive dismissal of the machine, it appears to 
be his opinion of the nature and utility of poetry:
Supposing it to be technically possible to make a 
computer write what will technically pass for 
poetry, we have still to ask about the poetry it
grinds out with such frightening industry and at
such tremendous speed whether it expresses the 
soul of the computer or the soul of the 
programmer. (Nemerov 395)
Nemerov derives this notion— that poetry should only reflect 
the "soul" of its author--from the classical debate between 
the poetics of Plato and Aristotle, wherein he summarizes 
the question of morality as an integral component of 
composition. Nemerov argues, quite presumptively, that all 
of "our ideas of what poetry does and how it does it" can be 
aligned on either side of this debate. He notes that, for 
Plato, the poet must be outside himself, possessed by a muse 
or god which dictates the words, while for Aristotle, the 
poet "is a rational and conscious craftsman," where
79
conscious thought guides his work (400). According to 
Nemerov, the computer appears to be aligned on the side of 
Plato, "where the poet is regarded as oracular, vatic, not 
speaking so much as spoken through by something other than 
himself" (400). Yet, one cannot adduce much from this 
association, as Nemerov proceeds to liken the computer to an 
"Other," again as a muse or god. At the end of his rambling 
essay, Nemerov offers three reasons why he hopes that poetry 
(which fits his model of form and content) will remain 
outside the abilities of computer scientists. He bases his 
first explanation on the apparent readership of poetry :
In a world where practically no one reads poetry, 
it is not really desirable, and may not even be 
sane, to increase exponentially the number of 
objects called poems, thus giving some poor idiot 
the task of deciding whether in fact they are or 
aren't. (Nemerov 412)
His abusive rationale might be easily dismissed as humorous 
if it were not for his claim that these reasons not be 
considered "frivolously intended" (412). It becomes 
difficult to take his comments seriously without contesting 
his insulting assumption that the respondents of my survey, 
including professors and graduate students, are nothing but 
"idiots."
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Nemerov continues his rationale against computer 
generated poetry by ludicrously positing the idea that 
writing poetry involves excitement and pleasure, as opposed 
to the insane creation of text via a machine: "The dullness, 
the want of gaiety and charm in the idea, are as appalling 
as the absence of sanity" (412), He also notes that "[t]he 
advantage claimed for the computer is its immense speed, but 
programming it, on the other hand, looks to be a slow and 
laborious and rather uninteresting business" (412). I 
imagine a great number of computer science professionals 
would disagree with his opinion of computer programming as a 
"rather uninteresting business." And while the "immense 
speed" of the computer certainly appears as an important 
feature, Nemerov overlooks that this speed must also be 
combined with randomization and information storage to 
generate text.
Nemerov's last reason consists of two questions: "Why 
should the idea ever have come up at all? To what need in 
the human spirit does it respond?" (Nemerov 413). In the 
first chapter, I pointed out that mechanical manipulation of 
text has a long history, and it appears sensible that one 
would apply these efforts to the digital computer--the 
latest evolution in machine technology - The second question 
Nemerov poses infers that computer poetry should satiate a
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"need," although he never offers an explanation of what 
desire human poetry supposedly fulfills.
Concluding his argument, Nemerov speculates on a future 
outcome in the relationship between computers and poetry:
[I]f poetry did come to be written by 
computers and people read and even declared they 
loved that poetry, one would still have to suspect 
that what happened was not so much that the 
machine had imitated the subtlety of the mind, but 
that the mind had simplified (and brutalized) 
itself in obeisance to its idol the machine. 
(Nemerov 414)
That the mind could be guilty of self-flagellation and 
idolatry to the machine seems to me to necessitate an 
initial separation of the two, something difficult to 
determine in our Western culture at the end of the twentieth 
century.  ̂ It appears that, to Nemerov, the pastoral 
poetries of Shelly or Sir Philip Sidney showcase the majesty 
of the human mind because they adhere to a traditional, 
established form, while the less "poetic," and experimental, 
work of Louis Zukofsky and even Ezra Pound represents the 
reader suppressing or compromising his or her mental 
faculties--another difficult distinction to maintain in the 
face of Contemporary Poetry studies.
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This notion of "obeisance to its idol the machine" also 
seems important for Josef Ernst, whose article "Computer 
Poetry: An Act of Disinterested Communication" attempts to 
"analyze computer poetry as an artistically adequate, 
although misguided, representation of the structure of the 
postindustrial 'information society'" (Ernst 451).
Apparently computers should know their place and remain 
relegated to cash registers and video games because, like 
Nemerov, Ernst finds it disturbing "that the act of thumping 
the keyboard erases the ambiguities of language cherished by 
traditional literature," and bemoans the idea as "not a 
problem of computer technology, but of its application" 
(Ernst 452). But does this really happen? Computers 
produce ambiguities in language through the randomization of 
the textual elements programs draw from, and preferencing a 
"natural" human quality of ambiguity while regarding 
computer output as unambiguous somehow implies, once again, 
the ability to differentiate between the two.
The conclusions Ernst draws concerning computer poetry 
focus solely on the output texts of William Chamberlain's 
Racter program, which as we have seen, contains the least 
interference by a machine and would be the least likely 
poster child for a serious study of computer generated text. 
In order to deny the worth of computer poetry, Ernst posits 
language as subordinate to politics and notes that the need
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to communicate "is inherent in every human activity, it is 
ultimately the political interests behind individual output 
that shape the substantive discourses" (Ernst 454) . To 
illustrate his point, he quotes this haiku-like Racter 
output :
In a half bright sky 
An insect wraps and winds 
A chain, a thread, a cable 
Around the sphere of water 
With the assumption that individual output infers human 
output, he concludes that Racter "neither initiates a 
conscientious critical process. . . nor is it based on a
recognizable human interest" and therefore "[w]hat looks 
like a poem and reads like a poem is not a poem" (Ernst 
455) .
Yet his rationale, without answering the begged 
question of what a poem supposedly "looks like" or "reads 
like," appears contradictory: "The typographic pattern on
the page and the highly subjective use of language--arranged 
in an old-fashioned grammatical and syntactical order— makes 
the above piece identifiable as poetry" (Ernst 455). If one 
of the criteria for defining a poem is the use of "old- 
fashioned" (I assume he means "correct") grammar and syntax, 
then Ernst seems to be at odds with most of what has been 
produced as poetry in this century.
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In fact, if the text was announced as a poem, the 
reader could construct a reading by focusing on these 
grammatical constructions. For example, the "half bright" 
sky creates a difficult image to visualize; the sky does not 
appear cloudy, but rather it lacks exactly half of some 
degree of illumination that could be defined as "bright" and 
may suggest mystery and ambiguity. In the second line, the 
subject of the text appears as an insect--one might imagine 
a spider, but the text does not specify a type of insect or 
even if the insect produces, or simply manipulates, the 
"thread" of line three. The insect "wraps and winds"--the 
juxtaposition of which contrasts the two differing 
connotations. Wrapping insinuates the idea of packaging, 
clothing, or hiding something, while winding infers the 
storing of the filament for the future, much like one winds 
wire or thread.
But the third line, containing the terms describing 
this filament, may perhaps be the most interesting and 
fruitful grammatical construction for interpretation. The 
three terms "chain," "thread," and "cable" appear linearly 
in the reading process, so that the next term in the 
sequence modifies the previous ones. Chains are strong, 
binding, oppressive, and connote possession, while a thread 
appears as the opposite. The delicate nature of thread 
joins objects more tenuously and less decisively than chain.
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but here "cable" appears in a sort of Hegelian dialectic of 
the two previous terms, a synthesis or average in which the 
last term read rests privileged in the reader's mind. The 
cable, thin as a thread while maintaining the strength of a 
chain, strikes a balance between the two terms. The 
indecisiveness of the metaphoric third line intensifies the 
ambiguity of what the "sphere of water" consists of, and the 
difficulties involved in such a task. This exegesis could 
lead to a number of final interpretations, including the 
analogy of the insect to a satellite in space. Circling in 
the "half-bright" sky of the earth's diurnal rotation, the 
satellite--appearing as an insect both in its insignificant 
size and in its physical resemblance with antennas and solar 
panel wings--"wraps and winds" both its orbit and its 
electronic signals around the Earth, a planetary sphere 
mostly composed of water. The invisible electronic cable of 
television, radio, or other telecommunication appears as 
delicate as a thread, but yet our modern world's reliance on 
these signals forms an unbreakable chain of dependence.
This short digression illustrates the problem in 
describing what action I just engaged in. Did I interpret a 
poem? Ernst claims that it is not a poem simply because of 
who, or more appropriately what, created it. "Before 
readers attempt an interpretation of the text," he adds, 
"they need to interpret their superficial identification of
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the piece as a literary genre," noting that the failure of 
readers to question their criteria of what constitutes an 
acceptable poem leads to the success of Racter's ruse (Ernst 
455). But if I, as reader, interpret those four lines from 
Racter as a poem, can one simply excuse my efforts as empty 
and insubstantial because I did not have prior knowledge 
regarding the mode of composition?
All of Ernst's objections seem to lie in our ability to 
discern human from computer poetry, and according to him the 
latter cannot be considered poetry because it does not 
possess the intention to communicate. P. D. Juhl formulates 
a similar argument, positioning his disagreement with 
computer poetry in relation to authorial intent. Juhl 
raises the question "Is the meaning of a poem necessarily 
the same whether it has been written by a person or produced 
by chance?" (Juhl 482). Again, the ability to distinguish 
between human and computer texts appears central, and this 
introduces a new point regarding authorship. Computer 
generated poetry implicates the faith we place in the honest 
responses from humans who claim authorship of given works; 
after all, if I allege a computer poem to be my own, who 
would contradict my claim? Since we have not defined 
criteria by which to differentiate, compositions by a 
computer may continually problematize any discussion 
concerning origin of certain contemporary poetries.
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Yet, by establishing and maintaining a relationship 
between speech, meaning, and origin, Juhl posits that "to 
'interpret' a computer 'poem' is not to interpret a poem" 
(481). Most modern philosophy assumes meaning to consist of 
mutual understanding between two or more individuals, which 
excludes the possibility of "personal" meaning. Rather, we 
have personal associations attached to words which others 
may or may not share, but we constitute meaning socially and 
culturally. Throughout his article, Juhl appears to use 
"intention" as a synonym for "meaning," and that confusion 
leads to the notion that human poems, provided we can 
distinguish them as such, have a meaning encoded by the 
author to be decoded by a reader. But if we consider the 
poem as a vehicle for coded meaning, rather like a 
cryptograph, then we could argue that only one answer can be 
the correct one. In this critic's formulation, either you 
decode the hidden message properly, or you get it wrong.
This somewhat New Critical stance leads Juhl to assume 
that every aspect of a poem must be considered intentional 
in order for anyone to be able to say anything about it: 
Clearly, the idea that certain words, lines, or 
sentences produced by a computer belong together 
or constitute a whole is unintelligible. In order 
for us to take certain words, lines, or sentences 
as belonging together or constituting a whole, we
must assume that they have been produced by a 
person and with certain intentions. Thus to call 
something a poem or even a text is to say, among 
other things, that the words, phrases, lines or 
sentences have not been arranged this way by 
chance but have been produced by a person and with 
certain intentions. (Juhl 485)
What appears obvious to Juhl actually arises out of a 
misunderstanding of how a computer composes poetry. He 
likens it to markings on a rock etched by the wind and asks 
how one could give meaning to such phenomena.'* But a 
computer does not spontaneously compose poetry. Although it 
contains an inherent random factor, it also reguires 
programming by a human. Template programs have their syntax 
already defined by the human programmer, and mangling 
programs work with probability based on an original human 
composition; therefore both rely on syntactic rules that lie 
outside of themselves in the human use of language itself-- 
in the same way that humans rely on these external rules.
So some degree of intentionality remains in computer 
programs, but only in the form of base rules for 
composition.
Juhl's idea of intention has often been aligned with 
the aspect of poetic voice— the conception of communication 
traditionally reinforced in the workshop poem. We
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customarily refer to the I, or self, in a poem as the 
"speaker," without often realizing that writing comprises 
poetry, not speech, and that speech comprises the recitation 
of poetry. But the tradition privileging the oral qualities 
of poetry leads to the same privileging of speech over 
writing, where writing becomes subordinate to or derived 
from speech. Therefore, only a human self has access to 
language, which reinforces the assumption that the poet 
intends to "say" something, a supposition with which Charles 
Bernstein disagrees :
It's a mistake, I think, to posit the self as the 
primary organizing feature of writing. As many 
others have pointed out, a poem exists in a matrix 
of social and historical relations that are more 
significant to the formation of an individual text 
than the personal qualities of the life or voice 
of an author. (Perloff 16)
These "social and historical relations" have their 
foundations in language, in the cultural agreement of 
meaning. If writing, not the self, lies at the center of 
poetry, then it suggests that communication and transmission 
of encoded meaning may be an inaccurate conception of the 
purpose of poetry and how it operates.
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As early as 1971, one of the seminal proponents of 
computer generated poetry, Louis T, Milic, attempted to 
devise a better explication of this problem:
One interesting result of my activity in computer 
poetry generation is a new definition of poetry.
In an important sense, strings of words are 
interpreted as poetry if they violate two of the 
usual constraints of prose, logical sequence and 
semantic distribution categories. . . .  In short, 
since the sentence is obviously well-formed 
syntactically but does not 'make sense', [sic] it 
is interpreted as poetry, as part at least of a 
larger poetic structure. (Milic 169)
In Milic's assumption, poetry becomes wholly figural--the 
lack of literal "sense" forces the reader to view the text 
as metaphoric. In the final analysis, however, Milic's 
conception of meaning entangles him in the same 
complications as Juhl by arguing that figurative language 
necessitates a recognition by the reader of a purpose behind 
the construction:
We perceive how readily we accept metaphor as an 
alternative to calling a sentence non-sensical.
We always tend, that is, to try to interpret an 
utterance by making whatever concessions are 
necessary on the assumption that the writer had
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something in mind of which the utterance is the
sign. (Milic 180)
Since the comparison in metaphor never presents itself 
explicitly, the reader of this construction, to use Donald 
Davidson's words, becomes "bullied into making this 
comparison" (Davidson 39). The reader attempts to determine 
not what the metaphor means (decoding the author's 
intention), but rather what it could mean, and many other 
factors influence which interpretation the reader ultimately 
accepts, such as context and a knowledge of the objects 
compared.
Milic, while supportive of computer generated poetry, 
views interpretation as futile and empty if no authorial 
intention exists, concluding that "[i]f we are not to waste 
our time in vain interpretation we must now ask a new 
question before beginning an exegesis: Who or what wrote 
this poem?"^ (Milic 180). Since he refers to a computer­
generated text as a "poem," I do not believe that Milic, as 
an English professor and proponent of computer poetry, would 
not recognize the difficulties implied in answering his 
question. To identify a text as a poem is to recognize 
certain features that traditionally define certain writing 
as art, and historically this label has been reserved for 
human products, which now the computer complicates. Of
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course, the possibility exists that Milic asks the question 
precisely to illustrate this dilemma.
Stanley Fish, in his famous controversial essay, "How 
to Recognize a Poem When You See One," relates how he 
deceived his class with an experiment in poetry 
interpretation. After listing the names of five people 
whose work he was discussing In a previous class, he told 
his seventeenth-century religious poetry students that they 
were looking at a religious poem of that era and asked them 
to Identify It. Using the analytical tools that they had 
attained In his class and others, they formulated a
impressive reading of the poem, an act Fish attributes to
one of context; "As soon as my students were aware that it 
was poetry that they were seeing, they began to look with 
poetry-seeing eyes, that Is, with eyes that saw everything 
In relation to the properties they knew poems to possess" 
(Fish 326).
Obviously Fish's "poem" does not contain Intention In 
the way the previous critics I have mentioned attempt to 
define poetry. Yet, his students thought they were seeing a 
poem, and acted In a specific manner. Juhl says they did 
not interpret a poem, and Milic labels that Interpretation
as vain, but both critics operate from hindsight and
additional knowledge, something not always Included or 
accessible to a given reader. Recent reader-response theory
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carefully avoids the "anything goes" impression of such an 
activity, positing instead the idea of interpretive 
communities which influence the way we read. Based on the 
reading and interpretation strategies employed by his 
students, Fish determines that readers create exegeses, 
instead of finding them:
Skilled reading is usually thought to be a matter 
of discerning what is there, but if the example of 
my students can be generalized, it is a matter of 
knowing how to produce what can thereafter be said 
to be there. Interpretation is not the art of 
construing but the art of constructing. 
Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them. 
(Fish 327)
The act of creating meaning from texts places interpretation 
and meaning not in an author to text to reader relationship, 
but in the act of reading itself, of which the reader has 
sole possession. The text appears not as something that 
conveys ideas through itself, but something the reader 
constructs meaning out of. This interesting perspective 
should not be overlooked, because it defines the methods of 
several contemporary poets.
As a Language poet and critic, Bruce Andrews argues 
that the traditional concept of meaning as an inherent
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object--like a diamond in the earth— does not acknowledge 
its own indebtedness to use:
Meaning isn't just a surplus value to be 
eliminated--It comes out of a productive 
practice. Not passively, as derivative of a 
system of differences (pre-defined) prior to 
composition. . . . Instead, active--back & forth:
a relay constantly making contexts out of a fabric 
of markings : writing & reading. (Andrews 135)
The notion that meaning resides not in the text as object 
but in the text as process establishes a battlefield for 
contemporary poetry, even down to the level of the word 
itself. "The coherence between the signifier & signified is 
conventional, after all," Andrews notes, observing that 
"rather than skate past this fact, writing can rebel against 
it by breaking down that coherence, by negating the system 
itself" (134) . Traditional poetry--what Jerome McGann calls 
"poetry of accommodation"— with its speaking self (or ego) 
and communicative function has a different agenda behind its 
construction, while some modern poetry (Language poetry 
included) operates with a politics that makes the reader 
aware of just how tenuous and arbitrary ink on the page can 
be (628) . The variance between signifiera establishes their 
relation to each other, but Andrews explains that "writing 
can attack the structure of the sign after declaring that
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settled system of differences to be repressive" (Andrews 
134). Language, as a system of signs, allows us to interact 
with others and talk about objects around us, but repeated 
assaults on and reappropriations of the sign threaten this 
illusion of security. Andrews remarks that these attacks 
only reinforce our stubbornness to consider language as an 
effective instrument of communication:
It's reached the point where a coercive 
organization of grammar, rhetoric, technical 
format & ideological symbols is normally imposed 
in everyday life to even get these eroded 
differences to do their job any more (an assembly 
line to deliver meaning, of certain kinds.) 
(Andrews 135)
Poets aware of this situation can exploit it, constructing a 
theory of poetics that McGann refers to as "oppositional" by 
exhibiting little concern about interpretation, "that 
positive obsession of academic discourse" and utilize 
nonsense, non-meaningful constructions, and fragmentation to 
achieve a level of "indetermination" (McGann 636). Through 
these tactics. Language writers try to "elucidate as it were 
the behavior, the manners, the way of life that various 
kinds of writings perform and live" (McGann 636).
Language poetry, in particular, works to counter 
preconceived notions of what a poem is or should be by
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working outside of those definitions. Fish's students, to 
recall, operate with a set of assumptions that have been 
learned and reaffirmed in poetry classes. These strategies, 
right or wrong, influence the reader's construction of 
meaning, of which Fish explains:
If your definition of poetry tells you that the 
language of poetry is complex, you will scrutinize 
the language of something identified as a poem in 
such a way to bring out the complexity you know to 
be "there." You will, for example, be on the 
look-out for latent ambiguities; you will attend 
to the presence of alliterative and consonal 
patterns (there will always be some), and you will 
try to make something of them (you will always 
succeed); you will search for meanings that 
subvert, or exist in a tension with the meanings 
that first present themselves; and if these 
operations fail to produce the anticipated 
complexity, you will even propose a significance 
for the words that are not there, because, as 
every one knows, everything about a poem, 
including its omissions, is significant. (Fish 
3 2 7 )
These criteria--a roadmap of reading strategies--help 
establish for "oppositional" poets a set of compositional
97
strategies to disrupt them. Since these poets, like Fish, 
view poetic discourse as not meaning-referential but 
meaning-constitutive, their work denies the "uncovering" of 
meaning in favor of the construction of it (McGann 636). 
While noting the diversity of the number of poets involved, 
McGann observes that Language poets "are involved with 
writing projects which fracture the surface regularities of 
the written text, and which interrupt conventional reading 
processes" (McGann 634).
Computer generated poetry could rightly be called a 
poetry of opposition because it, like Language poetry and 
other postmodern poetic forms and experiments, challenges 
readers' traditional assumptions of what constitutes and 
defines poetry. Analyzing the existing criteria some 
individuals have measured computer poetry against reveals 
subjective biases and problematic critical stances, yet the 
primary objection appears to be the loss of something that 
defines us as human. We should not, however, consider 
computer poetry as a replacement for human poets, but should 
view it instead as an impetus to reexamine our own poetic 
preferences. As Douglas Hofstadter acutely observes:
What makes [computer generated poetry] seem 
reasonably convincing as poetry is mainly our 
cultural context: the fact that twentieth-century 
literature enormously widened the range of
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acceptability of poetry and prose. Our century's 
open-minded, "anything goes" attitude has 
definitely encouraged wonderful types of literary 
experimentation, but it has also made it far 
easier for impostors, human or otherwise, to crash 
the party and go completely undetected. {Fluid 
Concepts 47 0)
Yet, computers can only compose text; no computer or program 
can interpret and understand poetry. This may not pacify 
some, but the unique human ability to construct 
interpretations and to imagine what the scratches on the 
tablet or the ink on the page could represent seems to me a 
far more important area of study. Rather than bemoan the 
loss of a repressive system of signification, we should 
direct more attention to how interpretive communities shape 
and influence both our use and understanding of poetic 
language.
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Notes:
1. Appendix 1 contains a copy of the actual survey, 
answers, and results of the those polled.
2. When the results were broken down into undergraduates, 
master's students or graduates, and doctorates, a slight 
increase in the number of correct answers appeared. 
Unfortunately, only 2 doctorates returned my survey, but the 
answers from those who did indicate that perhaps the level 
of education may affect one's recognition of computer 
poetry. However, the increase was only 13% between 
undergraduates and doctorates and only 3% between masters 
and doctorates. While doctorates scored the highest average 
of correct answers, this average of 56% hardly shows a 
considerable difference in aptitude.
3. For an interesting account of the postmodern attempt to 
make the machine invisible, see Strother B. Purdy, 
"Technopoetics: Seeing What Literature Has to Do with the
Machine," in Critical Inquiry 11 (September 1984), pp. 130- 
40 .
4. Obviously, one would have to be able to determine that 
the markings were made by the wind first, and not by human 
hands, in order to make this comparison. But suppose that 
some forms of erosion, like computer poetries, appear either
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indistinguishable from human markings or that there exists 
no objective means for determining origin?
5. Beyond the scope of this paper is the question of what 
makes a "good" poem, or whether some poems exhibit more 
creativity than others. But an interesting response comes 
from Douglas Hofstadter, who considers the possibility of a 
certain computer application displaying creativity:
Without some form of access to the Innards of the 
program, I simply don't know how to evaluate the 
product, and so I can't decide If real creativity 
was Involved or not. This attitude might seem 
strange to some people, who might say, 'What does 
It matter how It was made as long as It was made?
A product Is creative for certain external, 
objective reasons, not for how It came Into 
existence !' But I don't feel that way. I cannot 
judge just the object before me; I feel a need to 
have a sense for Its provenance. In some manner or 
other. (Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies 
481)
Conclusion
As my own survey shows, the sophistication of more 
recent computer generated poetry programs can create output 
that successfully mimics certain forms of human poetry.
This troubles many individuals; in fact, while researching 
this work, I was approached by many aspiring poets who 
stated in no uncertain terms that "a computer cannot write 
poetry." Interestingly, the same persons who expressed such 
strong opinions could not determine decisively whether a 
human or computer generated the stanzas in my survey, with 
one respondent going so far as to write on the bottom of the 
form that none of the fifteen examples were poetry.
This last remark lays the groundwork for a debate about 
how we view poetry and how we consider the author's role in 
the production of such texts. The poststructural work of 
Barthes, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, as well as the 
application of their ideas to poetic form appears to have 
very little appeal for people outside academia who may view 
poetry as a superlative form of communication or expression, 
a form of writing through which we, as humans, assert our 
emotions and our fears in the most dedicated and artful way - 
This elevation of the poem, accompanied by the 
responsibility and power associated with such a ennobling 
act, leads Shelley to his oft-quoted remark that poets "are 
the unacknowledged legislators of the world" (Shelley 969).
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But the work of Russian Formalism, by attending to poetic 
form rather than origin; New Criticism, arguing the 
"intentional fallacy" of Wimsatt and Beardsley; and 
Poststructuralism, which asserts the play of signification 
and questions the boundaries between poetry and everyday 
speech; all distance or remove the poet from the work to 
some degree, leaving very little theoretical space through 
which to posit that "poetry" cannot exist without a "poet."
While I feel that the all-encompassing questions of 
"what is poetry" and "what role does the art perform" lie 
beyond the scope of this work because of the dynamic nature 
of poetry and theory and due to the difficulty in decisively 
determining boundaries for the art, this study of computer 
generated poetry does work to reveal several preconceived 
biases about poetry and theory, particularly in relation to 
established notions of language as a strictly human domain. 
Even those poetic movements (such as Dadaism, Surrealism, 
Modernism, and Language Writing) that react in opposition to 
dominant traditions, always reaffirm a human presence, (at 
the very least, the original presence of a "rational" or 
"intelligent" being) even if they take such presence for 
granted. The level of technology emerging today reveals 
that we can no longer assume a human author for some forms 
of poetry; text generating programs, rather than reveal the
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person behind Oz, reinforce the curtain that separates the 
mode of production from the product itself.
At this stage of computer development, our claims about
language and the desires we place on language are not 
threatened. As I note in Chapter three, the computer can 
only mimic certain kinds of poetry, and certain structures
lie outside of the reach of today's efforts in programming.
Genre forms such as epic, dramatic lyric, sonnet, etc., are 
difficult if not impossible for a computer to generate-- 
although very few human poets today write in these forms. 
Ironically, contemporary poetry, with its emphasis on free 
verse form and its frequent avoidance of the lyric qualities 
of pre-modern and modern verse advanced the landscape of 
poetic form to a point where it converges with computer 
technology. By positing the absent "subject" or reducing 
authorship to a "function," poststructural theory coincides 
with developments in poetry that attempt to unwork the 
presence or centering of the speaking subject; Foucault 
cautions that the subject "is not in fact the cause, origin, 
or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken 
articulation of the sentence" {Archaeology 95). The "I" or 
ego of the text becomes disallowed because no one "owns" 
language.
The intrusion of the computer further complicates the 
notion of authorship because through aleatory functions.
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multiple input texts, and the indistinguishable contribution 
of those people involved, the computer reveals a 
conventional prejudice for the "who" behind the text as 
opposed to "what." What is at stake in any serious 
discussion of computer generated poetry is not the loss of 
our humanness, but how we have traditionally considered the 
origin of the text as crucial. In the worst case, the 
concept of authorial "intention" can represent 
inflexibility, repression, and inaccessibility because the 
work becomes a one-way conduit for transmission of meaning 
and idea. On the other hand, postructuralism and 
oppositional poetry (including Language poetry) attempt to 
shift critical attention away from the producer of the text, 
focusing instead on the reception of the text and 
questioning the ways in which readers have traditionally 
read poetry. Computer generated poetry contributes to this 
debate by placing emphasis on the way poetry and all art 
forms serve as a catalyst for human thought, reducing our 
need to concentrate on either the textual form or the 
author. As readers in an interpretive community, we may 
need to shift our discourse to a concern about what we do 
with poetry, rather than concentrate on where poetry comes 
from or what poetry does, because how we read any text still 
depends on our uniquely human condition.
APPENDIX:
COMPUTER POETRY SURVEY AND RESULTS
A . SURVEY
DO YOU READ POETRY: ALMOST NEVER OCCASIONALLY IT IS MY LIEE
LEVEL OE EDUCATION : UNDERGRAD MASTER' S DOCTORATE___________
1. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
The inner sun 
attempts summer stillness 
O cloistered Ineffable!
2. HUMAN or COMPUTER
Sentences for Analysis and Parsing Thayer Street 
Grammar School begins. James, bring me the 
vessel had been using that that. Our little lame, 
He hurricane. The love of money Is to prepare 
forsaken. Iron has brought It tremble. The young 
must do It Is.
3. HUMAN or COMPUTER
He had a stroke of luck 
where beasts lick their paws
of your armchairs and the fortune 
cookie right eye of your surprising 
spectacles carries the word 
like Typhoid Mary, dragging bones 
through green felt enough 
that rlen ne va plus
His last words, "Utah Shale and Advanced Ross," 
smile where bubbles burst.
4. HUMAN or COMPUTER
An angry writer remorselessly writes
about an old glass
A poem deliberately mangles shoes.
Walklng--
A woman sweeps the blue and violet skies
Dissonantly felt, because people listen sexually
A verdant devil abruptly drives over loneliness.
An angry watch
Mirrors a city, and further
A decayed feeling about mirrors sings
A thought that rarely comes on poems.
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5. HUMAN or COMPUTER
But could it come up into a limestone so correct, teeth 
would be slim by comparison. Have a go under the waterfall 
for health and a mouth to pour. White powder pile could be 
of snow or rock in flake. Seeds that hold all lime in ledge 
to grasp.
6. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
That force is lost 
which shaped me, spent
in its image, battered, an old brown thing 
swept off the streets 
where it sucked its 
gentle living.
And what is meat 
to do, that is driven to its end 
by words? The frailest gestures 
grown like skirts around breathing.
We take 
unholy risks to prove
we are what we cannot be. For instance,
I am not even crazy.
7. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
In the network, in the ruin, 
flashing classics gravitate, 
snared, encumbered voicelessly-
Teak enticements seek, leaping
fan-shaped arras corners
snore among in backward dispatch.
Panels glow, groan, territorialize 
fetishistically in nacreous 
instantaneity spookily shod.
8. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
Red river, red river.
Slow flow heat is silence
No will is still as a river
Still. Will heat move
Only through the morning-bird
Heard once? Still hills
Wait. Gates wait. Purple trees,
white trees, wait, wait.
Delay, decay- Living, living.
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Never moving. Ever moving 
Iron thoughts came with me 
And go with me:
Red river, river, river.
9. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
O thou.
Who moved among some fierce Maenad, even among noise 
and blue
Between the bones sang, scattered and the silent seas.
10. HUMAN or COMPUTER
Derrida loves awhile, he understands absolutely and ritually 
his pert fad
Nature accepts from him 
these bombshells like 
a number of fatalities.
They corrode,
I examine fantastic optimistic mysterious losses.
Derrida suffers for us 
his esoteric want stirs
a lot of profanities.
Why are eloquent unrealistic fictions 
like damned societies?
because fictions confide timidly.
Derrida begs for me,
my soul is like his fuzzy passivity -
11. HUMAN or COMPUTER
From the dying pastoral slopes an unwanted earth art gone 
And the vast edges draw back the impulse of an hour-- 
Exhausted, thou waitest for one desire, and the soft 
Abstractions of reapers in the intellectual trough.
So wild brother men, concealed then with distracted air-- 
Let it be spent on other joy, and we.
Wanderer one of antique shadow, rest 
And in the bluebell-drenched days, men 
Who in the sun, thy fire their being roll.
Come Shepard, bathe in our war of antique shadow,
'Tis this story of the wooden bridge, wrapt in disguise.
12. HUMAN or COMPUTER
The cleat curved you curved the spider 
the coil of alcoholic fumes 
the webbing of sail & sunset.
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over the mountain the distance: Colorado,
New Mexico. In Tucson
the beggars are gymnasts good riders swaying side-to-side 
are steerers covering much territory 
the backroom towel & soap the front leg.
13. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
comfort notions 
correction 
incapabie of keeping 
case-histories
foresee requisites 
talk about 
a grinning idiot
(ciosed down 
nothing comes up 
they ram a car 
up there 
instead of a cop)
14. HUMAN or COMPUTER 
Nature stimulates she quivers 
with affections.
Nature detests
your own orthodox, ambitious ideas from Heaven 
Her captivation requires dreams 
no atrocity likes
her brinkmanship: 
both cooperate aliegedly or symbolically while 
a single bold actuality strips and 
she heaves her captor 
her publicity is like her debt: 
it sings to universe.
Nature longs for the poet
her asylum requires this black flame.
15. HUMAN or COMPUTER
The bird covets her own victory;
Then guesses the company;
In her silent truth buzz no more.
The definition presumes her own thing; 
Then covets the victory;
Of her condensed journey buzz no more.
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The thing presumes her own civility; 
then advocates the nectar;
With her forbidden victory perish no more.
B. ANSWERS:
1. Generated by Haiku Master.
2. Generated by Hugh Kenner's Travesty given an input text
consisting of an elementary school grammar workbook from the 
late 1800s.
3. "No Chance Operations" by James Sherry.
4. Generated by DadaPoeia Generator v.1.0 (I have modified 
the program).
5. From "Manlius to Coeymans" by Clark Coolidge.
6. "Snake Eyes" by Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones).
7. "Trope Market" by Jackson Mac Low.
8. "Virginia" from Landscapes by T. S. Eliot.
9. Generated by the Kurzweil Computer Poet utilizing an 
input text consisting of poems from both P. B. Shelley and 
T. S. Eliot.
10. Generated by McPoet. Before running, I input "Derrida" 
as a male-gendered subject. The line breaks are somewhat 
random.
11. Generated by Brekdown after analyzing an input text 
consisting of Matthew Arnold's "The Buried Life," "Dover 
Beach," and "The Scholar-Gypsy." Edited to an unknown extent 
by John Tranter.
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12. From "Lapstrake" by Ted Greenwald.
13. "Road" by Kevin Magee.
14. Generated by McPoet. I input "Nature" as a female- 
gendered subject.
15. Generated by The Poetry Generator, after analyzing an 
input text consisting of Emily Dickinson's poetry. 
Grammatical errors edited out by George Stewart.
C. RESULTS OF THE HUMAN/COMPUTER POET SURVEY:
P E R C E N T A G E  O F  C O R R E C T  A N S W ER S B Y  C A T E G O R Y  O F 
E D U C A T IO N :
Question #; UNDERGRAD (26) M ASTER’S (9) DOCTORATE (2) OVERALL
1 42% 55% 50% 46%
2 88% 64% 50% 79%
3 62% 45% 50% 56%
4 15% 45% 50% 26%
5 46% 27% 50% 41%
6 88% 91% 100% 90%
7 23% 64% 100% 38%
8 58% 91% 50% 67%
9 38% 36% 50% 38%
10 27% 55% 0% 33%
11 46% 18% 100% 36%
12 35% 45% 50% 38%
13 19% 45% 50% 28%
14 19% 27% 0% 21%
15 38% 91% 100% 56%
W ERAGE: 43% 53% 56% 46.2%
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